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"Trusts have now pervaded all fields of social institutions in common law countries. 
They are like those extraordinary drugs curing at the same time toothache, sprained 
ankles and .baldness, sold by peddlers on the Paris boulevards; they solve equally well 
family troubles, business difficulties, religious and charitable problems. What amazes 
the sceptical civilian is that they really do solve them .............. The trust has 
everywhere planted itself like a cuckoo in the nest of civil law; and this is, as you will 
agree, a remarkable circumstance." 
(Sir Maurice Amos ( 1936-7) Harvard Law Review 1249 at 1263-4) 
'As endless in it's facets as mankind in it's characteristics and peculiarities, and 
exactly as interesting, the estate plan is far too worthwhile as an intellectual excercise 
to be made dependent upon tax quirks and loopholes; and it deserves to be co-joined 
with a motive far more noble than mere tax economics. The philosophical approach 
of the draftsmen and advisor is all-important. His first task is to make certain of 
his philosophy and of his fundamental respect for his own creation.' 
(Farr, J.S. An estate planner's handbook, quoted by Bobbert, M.C.J. Grondlyne van 
Strategiese boedelbeplanning, Tydskrif vir Regswetenskap, 1976 : 4) 
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Estate planning has been described as the process whereby a person acquires 
property, ensuring that he derives maximum benefits from his ownership and the 
enjoyment thereof during his lifetime, and that as much as possible and in the most 
economical manner with the minimum erosion thereof shall devolve upon his heirs 
when he dies. ( 1) The objective of estate planning is thus, in essence, the disposal of 
property during the estate owner's ('the planner') lifetime or upon his death. 
Trusts have over the years been an indispensable tool in the estate planner's armoury 
for achieving these objects. This has been so primarily because trusts, as an 
institution, bring about separate rights of ownership -not jointly- over an object, all 
equally valid, and, at the same time, each in the separate hands of at least two 
different persons, the one sporting a legal title, the other an equitable one. (2) In the 
past certain income tax benefits and estate duty savings contributed to the popularity 
of trusts in South Africa as business and estate planning tools. Trusts have been 
useful for estate planning purposes in order to peg the value of assets in a deceased's 
estate thereby reducing estate duty liability and insodoing preserve the estate for the 
heirs. To this end family trusts have become popular in practice since the growth in 
the asset(s) occur in the trust and not in the planner's estate; this (I submit) is 
particularly advantageous in inflationary conditions. 
The vexing question today is whether trusts will continue to play such a pivotal role 
in achieving the estate planner's objectives. In this dissertation I will discuss this 
pertinent issue with reference to the recent Katz Commission recommendations as 
well as to possible future legislative threats to planning with trusts. In addition, I will 
deal with the position of trusts in South African law with particular emphasis on : 
the essential features of a trust; 
the advantages of inter vivos trusts in estate planning; 
the legal nature of the trust beneficiary's right to the trust 
property : a distinction between vested and contingent rights; 
a comparison between the use of trusts, companies, close corporations and 
partnerships as trading structures for tax planning; and 
the basic principles of taxation of trust income as embodied in sections 7 and 
258 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 ('the Act'). 
2. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF A TRUST 
1. 1.THE DEFINITION OF A TRUST 
A trust is a contract whereby the founder transfers asset(s) to a trustee(s) in terms 
of a trust deed which provides that the trustee(s) shall have no beneficial interest in 
the trust property and shall apply the trust property for the benefit of some 
person(s) or for the accomplishment of some special purpose. (3) The essence of a 
trust is, thus, the separation of control or administration ( usually ownership) of an 
asset(s) from the beneficial enjoyment thereof. In this regard legal concepts such as 
vested and contingent rights are of particular significance. (4) 
It is evident from the nature of a trust that it provides a means for ensuring that 
income is derived by persons other than the owner of the asset(s) transferred to the 
trust. As a consequence of this feature trusts have frequently been employed in 
income tax planning, particularly as a means for ensuring income-splitting or of 
diverting income from a person paying tax at a higher marginal rate to a person 
paying tax at a lower marginal rate. In this regard the legal effect of section 7 (read 
with section 258) of the Act is of particular significance. (5) 
Huxam & Haupt (6) point out that from an estate planning perspective a trust has the 
following advantages : 
(i) it enables the founder to divest himself of his assets; 
(ii) the beneficiaries need not have a vested right to the assets; 
(iii) the trust is not a living person and will thus not have an estate duty problem. 
The principles surrounding trusts in South African law are derived from English law, 
with it's concept of dual ownership, and have been incorporated into our law through 
usage. Maitland (7) considered trusts to be "the greatest and most distinctive 
achievement performed by Englishmen in the field of jurisprudence." The South 
African law of trusts is governed by the provisions of the Trust Property Control Act 
57 of 1988. Section 1 (8) provides that trust property refers to movable or immovable 
property, and includes contingent interests in property, which in, accordance with the 
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provisions of a trust instrument. are to be administered or disposed of by a trustee. 
The said Act defines a trust as: 
"an arrangement through which ownership in property of one person is by virtue of 
a trust instrument made over or bequeathed -
(a) to another person, the trustee, in whole or in part, to be administered or disposed 
of according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person 
or class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the 
object stated in the trust instrument; or 
(b) to the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, which property is placed 
under the control of another person, the trustee, to be administered or disposed of 
according to the provisions of the lrust instrument for the benefit of the person or 
class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the 
object stated in the trust instrument. but does not include the case where the 
property of another is to be administered by any person as executor, tutor or curator 
in terms of the provisions of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965." (9) 
Section 1 of the Income Tax Act defines a trust as "any trust fund consisting of cash 
or other assets which are administered and controlled by a person acting in a 
fiduciary capacity, where such person is appointed under a deed of trust or by 
agreement or under the will of a deceased person". 
In Phillip Frame Will Trust v CIR ( 10) it was held that a trust is not a 'person' for the 
purposes of the Act. In CIR v Friedman & Others NNO ( 11) it was held that '[i]t is clear 
therefore that a trust is not an incorporated company. Nor is a trust a body of 
persons unincorporate whose common funds are the collective property of all it's 
members. There is also no basis for a submission that because the statutory definition 
of 'person' in sl of the 1962 Income Tax Act was further extended to include a 
deceased estate, it should by analogy be further extended to include a trust. The 
conclusion is inescapable that a trust is not a 'person' within the meaning of that 
word in the 1962 Income Tax Act.' Consequently, the Act was amended so that section 
1 of the Act now includes a 'trust' in the definition of "person" for income tax 
purposes. This amendment is deemed to have come into operation as from the 
commencement of years of assessment which commenced or commence on or after 
1 March 1986. Thus a trust is a taxable entity liable for tax in respect of the 
undistributed trust income of the trust. (12) 
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The essential features of a trust are ( 13) : 
(i) a founder (donor or settlor) with an intention to create a trust; (14) 
(ii) the identification and segregation of the asset(s) by the founder. The asset(s) 
placed in the trust must be clearly identified and will no longer be "owned" by 
the founder. The trust asset(s) are transferred to the trustee(s) in whom bare 
( unbeneficial) ownership of the asset(s) vest, coupled with an obligation to 
administer it for the benefit of the beneficiary or for some purpose other than 
the trustee's own benefit (so called "purpose trust"); ( 15) 
(iii) the nomination of trustee(s) to administer the trust for the benefit of the trust 
beneficiary; 
(iv) the identification of the trust beneficiary, that is the person entitled to the 
capital and/or income of the trust. It may include the founder and trustee(s); 
(v) the placing of an asset(s) under the control of trustee(s) who are empowered 
to act in their fiduciary capacity by virtue of letters of authority issued by the 
Master of the High Court ( 16). The founder is obliged to divest himself of, at 
least, part of his legal power in respect of the trust property. He may, however, 
be a trust beneficiary or trustee (but not sole trustee). ( 17) In it's strictly 
technical sense the trust is a legal institution sui generis. The trustee(s) is 
regarded as the owner of the trust property for purposes of administration of 
the trust but qua trustee he has no beneficial interest therein. On termination 
of the trust the trustee, in his capacity as such, acquires no personal benefits 
emanating from the trust property. On the trustee's death neither his heir(s) 
nor Iegatee(s) will succeed to the trust property. ( 18) However, the trust 
property does form part of the trustee's personal estate in so far as he, as 
trust beneficiary, is entitled to it; ( 19) 
(vi) the directions for the administration of the trust as embodied in the trust 
instrument. Purpose trusts apart. provision must be made in the trust 
instrument for the ultimate destination of the trust capital otherwise there is 
a nudum praeceptum which has the effect that the income beneficiary obtains 
full ownership of the trust property; (20) 
(vii) the object or purpose of the trust must be legal; (21) 
(viii) vesting depends on the terms of the trust instrument, although parties to 
the trust may have concurrently vested interests : the trustee(s) has bare 
dominium with control; the income beneficiary may have a vested right to the 
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income of the trust; and the capital beneficiary may have a vested right to 
claim ownership of the trust capital at some future date; 
(ix) trusts (in a strict sense) exclude other institutions (such as guardianship, 
curatorship and executorship) which also entail one person holding property 
for and on behalf of another person; (22) 
(x) ownership (minus control) may be vested in the trust beneficiary - a bewind 
trust. (23) 
1.2 CLASSIFICATION OF TRUSTS 
Trusts are classified, in the first instance, according to it's method of creation, in 
which regard one can distinguish between the following types of trusts : 
(a) Testamentary trusts - these are incorporated in a person's will. Academics 
seem to disagree as to it's moment of creation. While some academics (24) 
consider that a testamentary trust does not come into being until the 
trustee(s) has ownership of the trust asset(s), others (25) are of the view that 
the trust exists from the testator's date of death, though it takes effect only 
later. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the merit of these 
conflicting views, suffice it to say that the latter view seems to be the correct 
one. 
(b) Trusts mortis causa - these come into existence contractually but they are 
only registered in accordance with the provisions of Act 57 of 1988 and become 
effective upon the planner's death. It may be described as being a hybrid 
between testamentary trusts and inter vivas trusts but, because it is not a 
testamentary disposition, it need not comply with the formalities governing 
valid wills as embodied in the Wills Act 7 of 1953. 
( c) Inter vivas trusts - these are formed during the lifetime of the founder, 
emanate from a contract (eg. a contract between founder and trustee(s) or a 
contract contained in an ante-nuptial contract), exists from the moment when 
such contract is executed, and are registered in accordance with the provisions 
of Act 57 of 1988. (26) 
It is submitted that, in so far as estate planning is concerned, testamentary trusts 
are ideal for holding property for the benefit of a person(s) who is incapable of 
looking after his/her own affairs ( eg. minors); for protecting beneficiaries against 
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themselves; for obviating the creation of too big an estate for a surviving spouse; for 
achieving a better tax structure; for holding property such as farms or mineral rights 
which cannot be held in undivided shares, and for those cases in which a usufruct, 
annuity or fideicommissum can be improved upon. (27) It is my view that 
testamentary trusts and trusts mortis causa are, in comparison with inter vivas 
trusts, not ideal estate planning vehicles since they only become effective and 
operative on the death of the planner. It is my submission that inter vivas trusts can, 
as a rule, be accepted as the more appropriate vehicle for effective estate planning. 
This is so because they provide an excellent means for receiving property from the 
estate owner in order to peg the value of the estate in the owner's hands; for 
protecting assets against the owner's creditors; and for undertaking trading in the 
event of insolvency. (28) 
Secondly, trusts are classified according to the nature of the trust beneficiaries' rights 
as embodied in the trust deed. In this regard one can distinguish between three 
distinct categories of trusts (29) : 
(i) a bewind trust - this is a trust in the wide sense. Here real rights of ownership 
in the trust asset(s) vest in the trust beneficiaries. Should a beneficiary die prior to 
the termination of the trust, then the trust asset(s) to which such beneficiary was 
entitled are transmissible to his/her heirs, subject to the terms of the trust deed. The 
management and control of the trust asset(s) vest in the trustee(s) who are mere 
administrators and not owners thereof. (30) 
(ii) a vested trust - here both the ownership in and control of the trust asset(s) vest 
in the trustee(s) in their representative capacity on behalf of the trust. The 
beneficiaries enjoy a mere personal right to claim their share in the trust asset(s) 
upon the happening of the uncertain future event specified in the trust deed. In this 
sense capital and/ or income beneficiaries have a vested right either in respect of 
capital or income or both because, in the event of a beneficiary's death prior to the 
fulfilment of the stipulated condition, such beneficiary's personal right is 
transmissible to his/her heirs. (31) 
(iii) a discretionary trust - this is a trust in the narrow sense. Here the trustee(s) 
have a discretion as to whether, and to what extent, trust income is to be distributed 
to the trust beneficiary. Here both the ownership in and control of the trust asset(s) 
vest in the trustee(s) in their representative capacity. Any claim by a trust beneficiary 
to the trust benefits is dependent on the exercise of the trustee's discretion. Prior 
to the exercise of such discretion the beneficiaries have no rights so that nothing is 
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transmissible to a trust beneficiary's estate should he/she die prior to the exercise 
of such discretion. In other words, there are no vested rights between successive 
generations. (32) 
In light of the above explanation, I submit that the bewind and vested trusts are not 
effective vehicJes for estate duty savings since the benefits of a trust beneficiary are, 
in the event of death, transmitted to his/her estate and, consequently, the value 
thereof is incJuded in his/her estate for estate duty purposes in accordance with the 
provisions of the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955. The discretionary trust, on the other 
hand, may be considered an effective too] for estate duty savings in that trust 
benefits are not transmissible to a deceased beneficiary's estate prior to the exercise 
of the trustee's discretion and hence is not incJuded as. an asset in his/her estate. 
1.3 SUMMARY 
The basic idea of a trust is the holding of property by a trustee(s), not for persona] 
benefit, but for the benefit of named or determinable beneficiaries. Within the 
framework of a trust there is a separation of the formal ownership of an asset from 
the enjoyment of the benefits of ownership in relation to such an asset. Neither the 
inter vivos nor the mortis causa trusts possess legal personality. Although the 
common law does not recognise a trust as a legal person, (33) for insolvency purposes 
the trust estate is a 'debtor' in terms of the provisions of the Insolvency Act 24 of 
1936 but not a 'corporate body' which means that a trust is to be sequestrated and 
not liquidated. For income tax purposes a trust is a taxable entity; the· Act defines 
'person' to incJude 'any trust'. (35) 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ADVANTAGES OF INTER VIVOS TRUSTS 
2.1 WHY CHOOSE AN INTER VIVOS TRUST? 
A trust can be employed as a vehicle to protect or preserve the trust fund for the 
benefit of one or more beneficiaries ( or a succession of beneficiaries) over a period 
of time. It can also served as a safe-haven to protect the founder and his family from 
the financial vicissitudes that could arise from his economic or business activities. 
(36) Transferring asset(s) to a trust with power vesting in the trustee(s) to dispose of 
it carries with it the distinct advantage of creating a flexibility which the simpler 
form of bequest (eg. a usufruct or fideicommissum) cannot give and also allows the 
trustee(s) to bring a more impartial mind to bear on the question whether the 
property concerned ought to be retained or sold and the proceeds re-invested. (37) 
It is my submission that the primary consideration in the formation of an inter vivos 
trust is tax and estate duty benefits. Care must, however, be taken to ensure that this 
purpose does not unduly inhibit the beneficiaries' use and enjoyment of the trust 
asset(s) which they would have enjoyed had the asset(s) not been placed in trust. The 
emphasis is thus on the creation· of a trust which not only allows for the enjoyment 
of tax and estate duty benefits, but also optimum benefit of the asset(s) transferred 
to the trust. 
2.2. THE BENEFITS OF AN INTER VIVOS TRUST 
In light of my submission above, namely that an inter vivos trust is a more effective 
vehicle for estate planning than testamentary trusts and trusts mortis causa, one 
ought to consider the distinct benefits applicable to the formation of an inter vivos 
trust. (38) 
(a) The first category of benefit is defined as custodianship benefits and are applicable 
to all types of trusts outlined above. 
(i) Asset protection 
Placing assets in trust protects the assets from possible squandering and wasteful 
disposal thereof by, inter alia, minors, insolvents, incapacitated persons, and persons 
inexperienced in financial affairs. Further examples include the placing into trust of 
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pension, provident or retirement annuity fund lump sums on behalf of immature, 
young and incapacitated persons, and placing into trust an amount sufficient to cover 
the maintenance of a surviving spouse under the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses 
Act 27 of 1990. (39) 
The Katz Commission 4th Report (at p.13) pointed out that the normal asset 
protection trust arises from a donation by the founder or disposal of an asset(s) to 
such trust by the founder in consideration for a loan account. The income 
beneficiaries thereof include the founder, the spouse of the founder and their children 
and grandchildren whilst the capital beneficiaries include the children and 
grandchildren of the founder. It also said that another form of trust is the so-called 
'perpetual' trust where the capital beneficiaries are the founder's heirs and the 
income beneficiaries are the same as that in the normal asset protection trust 
outlined above. 
(ii) Asset management 
Where there same asset is owned by many persons with divergent requirements and 
expectations, the placing of such an asset into trust will facilitate the management 
and control thereof. (40) 
(iii) Reservation of rights 
The estate planner may reserve certain rights for himself which he would not have 
been able to do had he donated the asset outright. For instance, he can reserve the 
right to a portion of the trust income and/ or the right to have a say in the 
distribution of the trust income/ capital. 
(iv) Insolvency protection 
The 'creditor protection' which a discretionary trust affords is one of the pertinent 
benefits of the creation of an inter vivas trust. As a general rule, a creditor of an 
insolvent planner or beneficiary will not be able to set aside a trust transaction. This 
rule is, however, subject to : 
( a)the normal insolvency rules in respect of impeachable transactions; ( 41) 
(b)the estate planner being solvent at the time of the transfer of the asset(s) 
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to the trust. That is, the sequestering of an asset(s) in trust must not, at 
the time it is sequestered, result in the planner's liabilities exceeding his 
assets. ( 42) 
Subject to the aforementioned two conditions, a planner engaged in any trade 
which could reduce his estate or carries with it the risk of insolvency can 
protect himself and his family from financial slumps by placing his assets into 
trust and thereby protect it from the grasp of his creditors. To achieve this 
goal a trust deed can, in so far as any trust beneficiary is concerned, exclude 
the vesting of any trust asset(s) in such person(s) (43) or it can provide that 
such beneficiary would, in the event of such circumstance arising, lose his right 
in favour of another (eg. a spouse or any of his children), that is the so-called 
gift-over. ( 44) A trust beneficiary can be protected from the effects of 
insolvency by the inclusion of a clause in the trust deed which provides that 
in the event of a beneficiary becoming insolvent or an attempt be made to 
attach his share of the trust assets or should he attempt to cede his rights 
under the trust, such beneficiary's trust interest is to cease and devolve upon 
someone else. Such a clause may be coupled with a rider that, should the 
occasion for the forfeiture cease to operate, the trustee(s) could, in the 
exercise of their discretionary powers, restore the beneficiary's rights to 
him/her. (45) 
(v) Subsidiary purpose 
The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 prohibits subdivision of 
agricultural land in undivided shares without the consent of the Minister of 
Agriculture. Should such consent not be forthcoming one could place the farm 
concerned into a trust to be administered for the benefit of more than one 
beneficiary. 
(b) The second category of benefit relating to inter vivas trusts is fiscal benefit, 
predominantly applicable to discretionary trusts. (46) 
By divesting oneself of ownership of growth assets in favour of a trust one can achieve 
significant estate duty and related savings. The result of such divestment is that, from 
the date of transfer to the trust to the date of the planner's death, growth in the 
assets so transferred takes place in the trust. What the planner retains is merely the 
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value of the asset as at the date of transfer, usually in the form of a loan account. 
The planner's loan account can be reduced during his lifetime in one of two ways : 
(i) by interest-free loan repayments which are tax-free; and/or 
(ii) by means of tax-free donations not exceeding R 25 000 per annum from 
the planner to the trust. Section 56(2)(b) of the Act provides that 
'donations tax shall not be payable in respect of so much of the sum of 
the values of all property disposed of under donations by a donor who is 
a natural person as does not during any year of assessment exceed 
R25 000'. 
The aforementioned methods of reducing a loan account reduces the planner's 
potential estate duty liability. The use of interest-free loans, while contributing 
to estate duty savings, is not necessarily effective from an income tax point of 
view in that section· 7 of the Act deems income accruing from trust assets 
financed by interest-free loans to be the planner's income. In this regard see 
CIR v Berold 1962 (3) SA 748 (A); Joss v SIR 1980 ( 1) SA 674 (T); Ovenstone v SIR 
1980 (2) SA 721 (A). other taxes and costs saved by successive generations of 
trust beneficiaries include transfer duty, stamp duty, marketable securities tax, 
master's fees, executor's fees and conveyancing costs. These savings result from 
the mere retention of an asset(s) in trust on successive deaths of trust 
beneficiaries. A further fiscal benefit is the saving of income tax. As a 
consequence of the splitting of income after the death of the planner between 
the various trust beneficiaries, lesser income tax will be paid due to , 
beneficiaries falling into lower tax brackets. In addition, the planner could, in 
his will, bequeath to the trust any balance owing to him on the loan account 
by the trust as at the date of his death. While the value of such bequest would 
constitute an asset in the planner's estate for estate duty purposes, the fiscal 
benefit achieved. for the trust is that the trust is no longer indebted to the 
planner's estate in the amount of the loan. In this way a potential cash flow 
problem· for the trust could be averted. 
2.3 METHODS OF TRANSFERRING ASSETS TO INTER VIVOS TRUSTS 
Transfer of an asset(s) to an inter vivas trust can t_ake place either by way of 
donation, sale, or a combination of both a sale and donation, each of which method 
have attendant cost implications. 
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( a) Donation of an asset(s) to the trust 
In accordance with the decision in Ovenstone v SIR (supra), a donation is a gratuitous 
disposal of property or a gratuitous waiver or renunciation of a right by the donor 
thereof, the donee being thereby enriched and the donor correspondingly 
impoverished. If a planner donates his asset(s) to the trust he/she becomes liable, in 
terms of s64 of the Act, to pay donations tax of 25% of the market value of the 
asset(s) donated (subject to the applicability of the exemption provided for in 
s56(2)(b) of the Act). In terms of s59 read with s60 of the Act, the donor is liable for 
the payment of donations tax within three months from the date the donation takes 
effect, failing which the donor and donee are jointly and severally liable therefor. 
With regard to the tax implications of a donation, it is submitted that a disadvantage 
to the planner could be created in that it could create a cash flow problem and, 
furthermore, because it, in effect, means that the planner will be paying estate duty 
in advance. A further disadvantage relates to the loss of control by the planner with 
regard to the asset(s) donated as such. It must. however, be borne in mind that the 
planner will be saving estate duty on any growth in the asset(s) between the date of 
transfer of the asset(s) and his/her date of death, as the growth of the asset(s) takes 
place in the trust. In addition, the planner's estate will be reduced by the amount of 
donations tax paid and by the growth in value by which such amount paid would have 
increased up to the date of his/her death. 
However, if the latest Katz Commission recommendations are accepted then it will be 
possible, firstly, that a tax will be levied on the increase in the value of assets in a 
trust every 25 or 30 years so as to prevent the generation-skipping effect of trusts 
(47) and, secondly, that distributions from trusts will, in certain situations, be subject 
to a capital transfer tax. (48) It is submitted that. if this proposal were to be 
implemented, a donor may still be able to countenance the effect thereof by including 
an escape clause in the trust deed which will enable the trustee(s) to vest the trust 
capital in the beneficiaries, or possibly other trusts. ( 49) 
(b) Sale of an asset(s) to the trust 
Here the planner sells the asset(s) to the trust, there being a resultant loan account 
in favour of the planner in the amount of the purchase price. The asset must be sold 
at it's fair or current market value so as to prevent the possible invocation of the 
provisions of s58 of the Act. Section 58 provides that 'where any property has been 
disposed of for a consideration which. in the opinion of the Commissioner, is not an 
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adequate consideration that property shall be deemed to have been disposed of under 
a donation'. 
The disadvantage of such a loan account is that it is executable for the purposes of 
any third party liability claim and, furthermore, it constitutes an asset in the 
planner's estate for estate duty purposes. The loan may, however, be donated back 
to the trust at R25 000 per annum, which is, according to s56(2}(b} of the Act, the 
maximum value of donations which may be made annually by a natural person 
without incurring liability for donations tax; insodoing the monetary value of the 
planner's estate may be reduced. 
In practice it is common for such loan account to be interest-free or subject to a low 
(that is, below-market} interest rate so as to reduce or fix the dutiable value of an 
estate. The loan account is also, usually, repayable on demand which has the 
advantage that the planner retains a degree of control in the sense that he/she can 
call-up the loan account at anytime. In the case of interest-free or low interest loans 
the planner ensures that the value of his estate does not increase annually by the 
amount of interest which would otherwise have been payable to him. Also, by granting 
interest-free or low interest loans the planner can minimise his annual gross income 
thereby limiting his income tax liability. It is, however, possible that Revenue officials 
could argue that the granting of, for instance, an interest-free loan results in the 
loan being a 'continuous (deemed} donation' or a 'disposition' subject to tax in the 
hands of the planner in terms of section 7(3) and (5) of the Act. See Ovenstone v SIR 
(supra} and CIR v Berold(supra}. Accordingly, it is submitted that the issue as to 
whether interest ought to be charged ( or, if charged, the rate thereof} must, in the 
totality of the situation, be weighed in the light of the income tax and estate duty 
implications thereof. With regard to such loans, the Katz Commission 4th Report (at 
p.9) recommended that no specific legislation be introduced at this point in time to 
combat this 'scheme' but that it is open to the South African Revenue Services (SARS) 
to consider the introduction at a later stage of specific, as opposed to general, anti-
avoidance measures. 
lf shares and unit trusts are transferred to the trust then marketable securities tax 
(MST) of 0.25% on the market value of the asset so transferred is payable. If fixed 
property is transferred to the trust then transfer duty at a flat rate of 10% is payable; 
no transfer duty is payable for any subsequent transfer from the trust to a 
beneficiary. To this end it ought to be noted that the Katz Commission 4th Report (at 
p.6) has recommended that South Africa should introduce a capital transfer tax (that 
is a tax on the appreciation of wealth) in order to achieve horizontal and vertical 
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equity. In this regard the Commission (at p.12-13) has recommended that trusts be 
subjected to capital transfer tax on the basis that. at periodic intervals of 25 to 30 
years, the net assets of the trust be valued and subjected to capital transfer tax at 
the rate applicable to inter vivas donations and assets without any rebates. This 
recommendation of a 'generation skipping tax' was made in order to curb the use of 
generation skipping trusts as a tax avoidance mechanism. Such trusts acquire assets 
from the planner on the basis that the assets so acquired will be held by the trust 
for a period extending beyond one generation. In an extreme situation, the assets can 
be held indefinitely on the basis that allocations of capital and income will be made 
to the children of the various generations. However, the Commission also 
recommended that certain trusts should be exempted from capital transfer tax. These 
are trusts established by a parent, an immediate relative or guardian and the sole 
beneficiaries of which are the mentally or physically disabled or further issue of such 
parent. immediate relative or guardian. 
The table below sets out the tax implications of transferring an asset(s) to an inter 
vivas trust as well as the calculation of potential fiscal advantages in doing so. 
Form of Nature of Value-added Transfer Donations Marketable 
transfer of asset Tax (VAT) duty payable tax payable Securities 
asset to payable Tax (MST) 
trust payable 
movable NIL NIL 25% NIL 
immovable NIL 10 % of the 25% NIL 
Donation of value of the 
asset(s) to asset 
the trust 




movable 14% if entity NIL NIL NIL 
(trust) is an 
enterprise 
Sale of 
immovable 14% 10% of the asset(s) to NIL NIL 
the trust value of the 
asset 





NOTE: In the case of a sale of immovable property to a trust either transfer duty or 
VAT is payable on the purchase price (NOT both). 
2.4 THE CONTROL OF TRUST ASSETS 
The question of control over trust asset(s) is particularly important to an estate 
planner because it is only natural that a person who has through 'sweat and blood' 
built up a sizeable estate is wary of placing control of his asset(s) in the hands of 
others. However, to a certain degree this is necessitated by s3(3)( d) of the Estate Duty 
Act 45 of 1955 which provides that 'property which is deemed to be property of the 
deceased includes any property of which the deceased was immediately prior to his 
death competent to dispose of for his own benefit or for the benefit of his estate'. In 
other words, if this were the case, a liability for estate duty would arise in respect of 
such property. It is thus important that a planner is not in a position to dispose of 
the asset(s) which he has donated or sold to the trust for his own benefit or for the 
benefit of his estate. To achieve this goal one must ensure that the planner is, in 
relation to the other trustees, in a minority position. He could thus be appointed as 
a trustee subject to the following limitations : 
(a) that he is one of at least three trustees appointed in the trust deed; 
(b) that a quorum for any meeting of trustees shall consist of at least two trustees 
other than the planner himself; and 
( c) that the planner does not have the power of appointment and removal over his 
co-trustees. 
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The question which then arises is lo what extent can a planner himself benefit from 
the trust and how is a planner protected against any 'scheme' by his co-trustees? 
(a) the planner may be designated an income beneficiary; 
(b) he can benefit from the capital of the trust in terms of loan repayments; 
( c) he can be e·mpowered in terms of the trust deed lo borrow from the trust, the 
amounts so borrowed being set-off against his loan account; 
(d) he can be empowered in terms of the trust deed lo repurchase the assel(s) 
from the trust al any lime, which will effectively end the trust for all practical 
purposes; and 
(e) his loan account can be made repayable on call. This represents a 
powerful weapon in the hands of the planner in the event of him being al 




THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE TRUST BENEFICIARY'S RIGHT TO THE TRUST PROPERTY: A 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN VESTED AND CONTINGENT RIGHTS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
If trust property vests in the trustee(s) then the trust beneficiary has a ius in 
personam against the trustee(s) for the proper administration of the trust. (50) There 
exists no general rule which defines precisely the nature of the beneficiary's right to 
the trust property (income or capital). (51) Section 7 read with s25B of the Income 
Tax Act 58 of 1962 provides that trust income may, in certain instances, be taxed in 
the hands of the trust beneficiary. The determinative factor in each case is whether 
the beneficiary's right to the income is vested or not. The vested right is required to 
be unconditional. A right of this nature constitutes an asset in the beneficiary's 
estate. (52) A survey of our case law reveals that the content of the trust instrument 
is the decisive factor in determining whether the beneficiary's right to the income is 
vested or not. (53) 
3.2. VESTED AND CONTINGENT RIGHTS DISTINGUISHED 
To determine whether vesting has taken place the so-called vesting test can be 
applied. With regard to trusts this test involves asking the question whether the 
disposal of an asset by the founder in favour of a particular beneficiary causes the 
right thereto to vest in the beneficiary upon the occurrence of a stipulated uncertain 
future event, or whether vesting takes place before such occurrence, for instance, at 
the date the trust becomes operative. The application of this test involves a 
distinction drawn in our jurisprudence between vested and contingent ( or conditional) 
rights. (54) 
Hutchinson (63) submits that contingent rights are rights subject to a suspensive, as 
opposed to a resolutive, condition. The legal effect of a suspensive condition, in the 
realm of the law of contract, is that it suspends the full operation of the contractual 
obligation and renders it dependent on the occurrence of an uncertain future event; 
whereas in the case of a resolutive condition the normal consequences flow from the 
contract from the moment of it's conclusion, but on the happening of the stipulated 
future event these consequences are terminated. ( 64) 
18. 
Similarly, Cowen ( 65) submits that it is in cases of rights subject to a suspensive 
condition, 'where the title ( of the right) may never be completed and the prospective 
right may, therefore, never come into existence, that the idea of a contingent right 
in the strictly technical sense is associated. The case where all of the investitive facts 
are certain in the ordinary course of nature to occur in the future stands in sharp 
contrast. Thus, in Romanistic jurisprudence generally, and in South African law in 
particular, investitive facts which are yet to occur but are certain to do so, are, as 
a general rule, deemed to have occurred and the title, and consequent right, are 
regarded as complete. When all of the investitive facts which are necessary to create 
a right have occurred, then, in what is commonly regarded as the strictly technical 
sense of the term, the right is said to be 'vested' - a vested right in the technical 
sense being simply one the title of which is complete and unconditional. By contrast, 
where one or more of the investitive facts has already happened, but one or more has 
not yet happened and may never happen, the prospective right is contingent in the 
technical sense of that term.' The Oxford Companion to law defines an 'investitive 
fact' as 'a fact which invests a person with a particular legal right.' 
Corbett et al (66) explains "vest" (at p.133) as follows : 
'In legal parlance the terms 'vest','vested' and 'vesting' bear different meanings 
depending on the context in which they are used. When used in connection with rights 
of succession they indicate what is fixed and certain as distinct from that which is 
conditional or contingent. Thus an inheritance, bequest or other interest in a 
deceased estate is said to "vest" in the heir, legatee or other beneficiary concerned 
if and when the right thereto has become unconditionally fixed and established in 
such person. A vested interest of this nature is normally transmissible to the heirs 
or representatives of the beneficiaries upon his death or insolvency and forms an 
asset in his estate. This is not so in the case of a conditional or contingent interest: 
it confers no transmissible right upon the beneficiary unless and until the condition 
is fulfilled.' 
In ITC 76 (55) the court held that 'a vested right was something substantial; 
something which could be measured in money; something which had a present value 
and could be attached. A contingent interest was merely a spes - an expectation 
which might never be realised.' CIR v Estate Crewe (56) held that 'a right is vested if 
the beneficiary is determined and his ownership of the right is unconditional; it is 
contingent if his ownership of it is conditional upon some uncertain event.' 
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In Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd v Estate Nathan (57) the court, per Watermeyer JA, 
explained the distinction between vested and contingent rights in the context of 
testamentary succession. The learned Judge held that the word 'vest' bears different 
meanings according to it's context. In terms of one meaning, the word is used 'to 
draw a distinction between what is certain and what is conditional; a vested right as 
distinguished from a contingent right. When the word vested is used in this sense 
Austin (Jurisprudence vol.2 Iect 53) points out that in reality a right of one class is 
not being distinguished from a right of another class but that a right is being 
distinguished from a chance or a possibility of a right, but it is convenient to use the 
well-known expressions vested right and conditional right. Now whenever a bequest 
is made in words which indicate that the right bequeathed is not to be enjoyed or 
exercised until some future date (that is some future date after the testator's death), 
then the question always arises whether the words indicating future enjoyment were 
inserted for the purpose of making the bequest conditional or merely for the purpose 
of postponing the enjoyment of the bequest. The answer to that question ultimately 
depends on the intention of the testator as gathered from the terms of the will, but 
there are many rules of construction which assist in the decision of the question. If 
the bequest is unconditional then the legatee acquires a vested right in the bequest 
from the date of the death of the testator ( dies cedit) though he cannot enjoy it until 
the time arrives for enjoyment ( dies venit); if on the other hand the bequest is 
conditional, he acquires no vested right ...... ' This dictum has been confirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal. See Durban City Council v Association of Building Societies 
(58) and (more recently) Mcalpine's case (supra) (at 762), as well as the authorities 
cited there. 
The ratio decidendi of the Jewish Colonial Trust case (supra) is that whether in a 
particular case words of futurity postpone vesting or merely enjoyment depends on 
intention. In the case of a trust it is the intention of the founder as embodied in the 
-trust deed which will determine the time of vesting of the benefits in the trust 
beneficiaries. If the right of a beneficiary is made conditional upon the happening of 
an uncertain future event then, in the absence of indicia of a contrary intention, the 
founder intended vesting to be postponed until the condition is fulfilled. However, 
compare Wynn NO and Westminster Bank Ltd NO v Oppenheimer and Others (59). 
In Trustees of the Hull Trust Fund v CIR (supra) the trustees of an inter vivas trust 
were assessed as representative taxpayers on income received by them from funds 
they held in trust. The donor donated two sums, one expressed to be for the benefit 
of his existing grandchildren (the Schedule A beneficiaries) and the other for the 
benefit of his grandchildren yet to be born (the Schedule B beneficiaries). In terms 
of the trust deed each grandchild was entitled to receive his/her benefits only if and 
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when he reaches the age of 25. The Commissioner assessed the income arising from 
the two funds as the income of one trust. Objection was made, inter alia, on the basis 
that each Schedule A beneficiary should be assessed separately. The legal question 
which arose was whether the Schedule A beneficiaries had a vested or accrued right 
or interest in or to any of the trust funds and consequently that each such 
beneficiary could be separately assessed. The court (60) held that the true import of 
the trust deed was that the benefits to a Schedule A beneficiary was conditional on 
him/her attaining the age of 25. Should any such beneficiary die prior to reaching the 
age of 25 without leaving any issue, then such beneficiary's share would pass back to 
the trust to be held for the benefit of the Schedule B beneficiaries. It held further 
(61) that 'on consideration of the Trust deed as a whole, it created a fideicommissum 
in favour of the Schedule A beneficiaries, but conditional in that the funds vested 
entirely in the trustees until the fulfilment of the condition.' To this end the court 
(per Krause J) adopted the principles laid down in Estate Kemp v Macdonald's Trustees 
(supra) where Innes CJ (62) expressed the view that 'the general presumption, where 
a testamentary disposition is expressed in the form of a fideicommissum, is that the 
testator intended to postpone any vesting in the fideicommissary heirs until the 
happening of a specified condition. Pending that event, the dominium is in the 
fiduciary, and a mere spes in the remainderman. But this presumption must yield to 
the clearly expressed intention of the testator to the contrary ............ The ordinary 
rules of vesting (and hence transmissibility) of rights under a fideicommissary bequest 
must give way when in conflict with the intention of the testator.' In the 
circumstances the court held that since there had been no vesting in the Schedule 
A beneficiaries prior to the fulfilment of the condition in question, the trustees had 
been correctly assessed. 
Similarly, in Estate Dempers v SIR 1977 (3) SA 410 (A) the court interpreted what 
constitutes a 'fixed or contingent event' in the context of s7(5) of the Act. It held that 
a 'contingent event' is one which may or may not happen. 'Contingent', it held, is also 
used to describe a right which is conditional and uncertain, as opposed to a vested 
right which is certain. unconditional and immediately acquired, even though in some 
instances enjoyment of the right may be postponed. In casu it was held that a vested 
right was not a sine qua non for the application of s7(5). although the presence 
thereof is a strong, even decisive, factor leading to the conclusion that, but for the 
stipulation withholding the income, it would have been received by the trust 
beneficiaries. However, contra ITC 1328 43 SATC 56 where the court held that it was 
not a necessary consequence of vesting that the beneficiaries concerned have a legal 
right to claim payment. On the facts of that case the court concluded that the 
beneficiaries had indeed acquired an immediate right to the income even though 
enjoyment thereof had been postponed until the exercise of the trustee's discretion 
in their favour. 
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In Hilda Holt Will Trust v CIR 1992 ( 4) SA 661 it was held that it is possible for an 
uncertain but ascertainable amount in futuro to vest immediately and where a will 
contemplates that there will be a residue for distribution to ultimate beneficiaries, 
then the intention to postpone vesting is not present. The usual condition of 
survivorship found in a true fideicommissum bequest is not present where the 
ultimate beneficiary is a charity with an apparently indefinite future existence, and 
there can be an immediate vesting of capital, including income which is surplus to 
the amount necessary to pay a stipulated annuity. ' 
3.3. TAXATION OF TRUST BENEFICIARIES 
Trust beneficiaries are taxed on income which form part of their 'gross income' as 
defined in the Income Tax Act. Gross income is defined in sl of the Act as including 
'the total amount.. ...... received by or accrued to' any person. CIR v Lategan (67) held 
(per Watermeyer J) that if a beneficiary has no vested right to income but merely a 
contingent right, then it cannot be said that the income has 'accrued to' him for the 
purposes of 'gross income' ( as defined). For income tax purposes trust income which 
the trustee(s) have 'credited in account or re-invested or accumulated or capitalized 
or otherwise dealt with' in the name of or on behalf of the trust beneficiary is 
deemed to have accrued to such beneficiary. (68) 
For many years uncertainty prevailed in our law as to the precise meaning of the 
words 'accrued to' for the purposes of 'gross income'. (69) However, the controversy 
ended when the court in CIR v People's Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd (70), after 
reviewing our law as to the interpretation of the words 'accrued to', upheld the 
interpretation of Watermeyer J in the Lategan case (supra) as to the meaning of 
'accrued to'. The court (per Hefer JA) held that 'no more was required for an accrual 
than that the taxpayer had become entitled to an amount. Thus any right acquired 
by a taxpayer during the year of assessment and to which a money value could be 
attached represented an accrual irrespective of whether it was immediately 
enforceable or not.' (71) The 'entitled to' principle was extended in Mooi v SIR (72) 
where it was held that accrual takes place only when the taxpayer becomes 
unconditionally entitled to an amount (in cash or otherwise). The effect hereof is that 
an entitlement which is conditional upon the happening of a future event does not 
result in an accrual until the event has occurred. 
In a non-discretionary trust the income thereof vests in the beneficiaries whether it 
is paid to them or not. In such a case the beneficiary is said to have a vested right 
to the income (ie. it is their income). (73) Income which has vested as such in a 
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beneficiary is deemed to have accrued to such beneficiary and is taxable in his hands. 
Section 25B( 1) of the Act provides that any income received by or accrued to a 
trustee shall, to the extent to which the income has been derived for the benefit of 
any ascertained beneficiary with a vested right to the income, be deemed to be 
income which has accrued to the beneficiary. In the case of a discretionary trust (ie. 
a trust in which the trustee(s) has the power not to distribute the trust income or 
some portion thereof to the trust beneficiary), prior to the exercise of the discretion 
the beneficiary has no more than a contingent right; on the exercise thereof the 
beneficiary acquires a vested right to the trust income and becomes taxable thereon. 
(74) The legal implication hereof is that there can be no accrual of trust income to 
a beneficiary unless and until the trustee exercises his discretion in favour of a 
particular beneficiary. Silke refers to this as the application of the discretionary 
income rule which provides that : 
'where the trustee exercises a discretion vested in him and the beneficiary acquires 
a vested right to income, the income is deemed to have been derived for the benefit 
of the beneficiary unless the provisions of section 7 of the Income Tax Act intervene; 
thus it is treated as the beneficiary's income.' (75) 
A beneficiary who has a vested right to income and capital must include in his gross 
income (as defined) the distributions of trust income received by him as well as any 
non-deductible expenses. However, if a beneficiary is entitled merely to the net 
income of the trust then non-deductible expenditure is not added to the beneficiary's 
income; it is added to the income of the trustee in his representative capacity and 
is taxable in the hands of the trust. (76) According to s25B(3) any deduction or 
allowance which applies in respect of income received by or accrued to a trustee will 
be deemed to be deductible in the hands of the beneficiaries but only to the extent 
that the income is deemed to accrue to the beneficiaries. For example, if a trustee 
receives trust income amounting to R100 000 and deductions in the amount of 
R25 000 may be claimed in respect of such income, then if 60% of the income is 
deemed to accrue to the beneficiaries they will be entitled to claim 60% of the 
deductions. Furthermore, trust beneficiaries may deduct expenditure or losses 
incurred in deriving income from a trust, provided they incur an unconditional 
obligation to make the payments and the trust income vests in the beneficiaries 
concerned. In this regard the court in ITC 1483 (77) held (per obiter) that 'if profits 
of a trust vest in the beneficiaries ......... (then) this should include the losses'. On this 
basis it upheld the taxpayer's appeal against the Commissioner's disallowance of a loss 
incurred in operating a speculative business venture through a trust. 
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3.4 SUMMARY 
In terms of s12 of Act 57 of 1988, trust property does not form part of the trustee's 
personal estate except in so far as he as trust beneficiary is entitled to the trust 
property. As a consequence of the fiduciary relationship which exists between the 
trustee and the trust beneficiary with respect to the trust property, the property 
vested in the trustee must at all times be administered for the benefit of the 
beneficiary. The trust property does not vest in the beneficiary and he, accordingly, 
enjoys mere personal rights against the trustee for the duration of the trust. The 
nature of the rights of the trustee and the beneficiary is such that the trust property 
cannot, for the duration of the trust, form part of their personal estates. (78) The 
Katz Commission 4th Report (at p.13-14) has recommended that distributions of 
capital out of trusts should be subjected to capital transfer tax, except where this 
would result in double capital transfer tax being imposed. In this regard it 
recommended that legislation will have to define 'distribution' to include the act of 
vesting rights in a trust in the trust beneficiary. For this reason the vested right 
would be subjected to capital transfer tax and not the generation-skipping tax 
proposed by the Commission. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN DIFFERENT FORMS OF TAX PLANNING STRUCTURES : A 
PARTNERSHIP. CLOSE CORPORATION (CC), COMPANY AND TRUST 
4 .1.1 PARTNERSHIPS 
Legally, a partnership does not have a separate existence. A partnership may be 
described as 'a particular type of business association formed by persons who intend 
to make and share profits. More technically it may be defined as a legal relationship 
based on an agreement between two or more persons who undertake to contribute 
something to a lawful enterprise which is carried on with the object of making a 
profit and sharing it between the partners.' (79) 
A partnership is not defined in the Act, and for income tax purposes it is not 
regarded as a taxpaying entity, although it is recognised as such for Value-Added Tax 
purposes. (80) It's status under the Act is, in effect, a reflection of it's common law 
position. Under the common law a partnership is not a separate persona in that it is 
not separate and distinct from it's constituent members. A partnership is allowed a 
maximum membership of 20 partners. (81) A partner does not have to be a natural 
person and any company, CC or trust may be a partner in which event the taxation 
principles applicable to each of those trading structures will apply in relation to their 
aliquot share of the partnership income, losses, taxable income and assessed losses. 
With regard to taxation, section 66( 15) of the Act provides that 'persons carrying on 
any business in partnership shall make a joint return as partners in respect of such 
business .......... and each partner shall be separately and individually liable for the 
rendering of the joint return.' In practice the SARS usually accepts a copy of the 
partnership's financial statements from any one of it's partners. Section 77(7) 
provides that 'separate assessments shall, notwithstanding the provisions of s66( 15), 
be made upon partners'. In other words, the partners are liable for tax in their 
individual capacities according to their profit-sharing ratio. (82) Each partner will 
thus pay tax according to a progressive ratio. (83) In terms of section 24H(2) each 
partner, notwithstanding the fact that he may be a limited partner, is deemed to be 
carrying on the trade or business of the partnership. In terms of s24H(5)(a) any 
income which has been received by or accrued to the partnership is deemed to be 
received by or accrued to the partners in their profit-sharing ratio on the same date 
on which it is received by or accrues to the partnership. According to this same 
formula, deductions and allowances relating to 
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such amounts are also deemed to be those of the individual partners. (84) The 
purpose of this provision is to override a legal principle established in Sacks v CIR 
(85) where it was held that the partner's share of profits only accrued to him at the 
end of the partnership's financial year when the profits were brought to account. It 
is submitted that the practical difficulties created by this provision may, to an extent, 
be overcome by making the partnership's tax year-end the same time as that of the 
partners. 
With regard to assessed losses, these may be set-off in much the same way as in the 
case of a sole proprietor. Section 20( 1 )(b) provides that 'for the purpose of 
determining taxable income derived by any person from carrying on any trade within 
the Republic, there shall be set-off against the income so derived by such person any 
assessed loss incurred by the taxpayer during the same year of assessment in carrying 
on in the Republic any other trade either alone or in partnership with others ...... ' The 
set-off of any balance of assessed loss is, in the case of a corporate partner, 
admissible only against income derived from carrying on a trade; the assessed loss 
will be irretrievably lost if it ceases trading in the year subsequent to the assessed 
loss being incurred. (86) 
The Act restricts the deductions of limited partners. Section 24H( 1) defines a 'limited 
partner' as 'any member of a partnership en commandite, an anonymous partnership 
or any similar partnership, if such member's liability towards a creditor of the 
partnership is limited to the amount which he has contributed or undertaken to 
contribute to the partnership or is in any other way limited'. In terms of s24H(3) 
allowances or deductions which may be granted to any limited partner ( excluding the 
marketing allowance available in terms of s11bis of the Act) shall not in the aggregate 
exceed the sum of the amount which such partner is or may be liable to creditors of 
the partnership and any income received by or accrued to such partner from the 
partnership business. Section 24H( 4) provides that 'any allowance or deduction which 
has been disallowed under s24H(3) shall be carried forward and be deemed to be an 
allowance or deduction to which the taxpayer is entitled in the succeeding year of 
assessment'. 
With regard to partnerships, the planner ought to pay careful attention to provisions 
relating to goodwill as those aspects will affect him in the event of a subsequent 
termination of the partnership. Goodwill may be explained as that which the planner 
would hope would be built up in his future partnership as a result of sound and 
successful trading. It is an element which can be regarded as "whatever adds value 
to a business by reason of situation, name and reputation, connection, introduction 
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to old customers and agreed absence from competition." (87) 
Gross income is defined as 'excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature.' (88) 
Since the purchase and sale of goodwill is essentially a transaction on capital account, 
therefore, generally, an outgoing partner who receives a lump sum for his share of 
the partnership goodwill is in receipt of capital and hence a non-taxable receipt. 
Conversely, the remaining partner(s) who make such goodwill payment will have a 
non-deductible capital expense. (89) However, if the outgoing partner receives 
payment for goodwill by way of an annuity he will be taxed thereon (90) whereas the 
remaining partner(s) will not be allowed any deduction for the annuity payments 
insofar as those payments constitute expenditure of a capital nature. (91) The 
essential features of an annuity are that it must be a fixed periodical payment even 
if divided into instalments. it is repetitive (that is, it is payable over some period) and 
it is chargeable against some person. (92) If payment for goodwill is made in 
instalments which do not constitute an annuity. then the receipt of such monies will 
not be taxed in the hands of the recipient nor deductible in the hands of the one 
effecting payment thereof. In addition, where the outgoing partner is not paid a lump 
sum for goodwill but is paid a share of the future profits of the partnership over a 
specified period. such partner will be taxed on the amount so received as it 
constitutes income in his hands, whereas the remaining partners will not be entitled 
to any deduction for the share of profits so paid insofar as the payments will 
represent expenditure in the acquisition of a capital asset or, alternatively, a disposal 
of earnings after their accrual in favour of the remaining partners. (93) It is 
submitted that if one wishes to link an outgoing partner's goodwill payment to future 
profits of the partnership then one ought to do this by way of an out-and-out 
cession by the remaining partner(s) to the outgoing partner of the agreed percentage 
of the future profits over the specified period. In this way the remaining partner(s) 
will avoid the imposition of tax on the amount so paid to the outgoing partner 
although the latter will be taxed thereon insofar as the receipt thereof constitutes 
income which, but for the cession, would have accrued to or been received by the 
partnership. 
4.1.2 A COMPARISON BETWEEN PARTNERSHIPS AND TRUSTS 
The partnership, as a legal concept, has several peculiar characteristics restricting it's 
usefulness. These are, inter alia, that it's lifetime is limited and uncertain; on the 
death or insolvency of a partner the partnership terminates; and any partner can 
normally terminate it at any time. Furthermore. because partners are jointly and 
severally liable for all partnership debts, a partnership may be appropriately described 
as a commercial marriage for which people can pay dearly if matters go wrong. ( 94) 
27. 
Having regard to these factors it is submitted that a trust ought to be preferred to 
a partnership for achieving a better tax dispensation. In this regard one ought to take 
cognisance of the fact that the duration of a trust is not dependent on the 
resignation or death of a trustee; the trustee(s) are generally not held personally 
liable for their actions as trustee(s) since they enjoy a form of limited liability; and 
all income and expenditure in a partnership vests in the partnership whereas in the 
case of a trust it could vest either in the trust, the beneficiary, the founder or be 
apportioned between all of them. (95) 
4.1.3 SUMMARY 
A partnership is not taxed as a separate legal entity. The essence of the taxation of 
a partnership is that there exists no separate legal identity for income tax purposes 
between the partnership and it's partners; a partner's pro rata share of the income 
derived or loss made by the partnership is added to, or subtracted from, the partner's 
income from other sources; where the partner is a natural person his share of any 
partnership assessed loss may be carried forward to a succeeding tax year even if no 
income is derived in the former year of assessment; there is no additional action 
needed to extract profits from the partnership involving any further potential tax 
consequences; and the reporting requirements are the same as that of a sole 
proprietor, namely there is no obligation to submit an annual audit of the trading 
activities nor is it required to furnish a year-end report. From a tax perspective a 
partnership is an attractive trading structure because of it's flexibility and the 
advantageous tax positions of the partners and because of it's facility for multiple 
membership without legal incorporation. It's shortcomings stem from legal 
considerations such as the absence of protection from unlimited personal liability for 
partnership debts, the absence of perpetual succession for the partnership business 
and multiple membership is limited statutorily. 
4.2.1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND COMPANIES 
Companies and close corporations (CC). to some extent. offer businessmen an 
important tax shelter from high personal taxation rates. The legal position of a CC is 
governed by the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 and that of a company is regulated 
by the Companies Act 61 of 1973. Taxation of both these trading structures is 
governed by the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
Until 1990 it was more advantageous to use a CC than a company because 
distributions to CC members were not subject to normal tax, whereas dividends 
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declared by companies were subjected to tax in the hands of shareholders, who were 
natural persons. This fiscal advantage has, however, disappeared by virtue of s10( 1 )(k) 
of the Act (96) in terms whereof dividends received by South African residents are 
exempt from tax. Thus, from a tax perspective there is no longer any material 
difference between a company and a CC and the liability for Secondary Tax on 
Companies (STC) is the same mutatis mutandis for both these trading structures. (97) 
Accordingly, depending on circumstances, sound commercial and practical advantages 
may exist for using a CC instead of a company as a trading structure, and vice versa. 
In so far as companies are concerned, a distinction is, for income tax purposes, drawn 
between public and private companies. (98) Since the abolition of undistributed profits 
tax, the significance of this distinction lies, firstly, in that public companies are not 
subjected to tax on donations (99) and, secondly, that amounts payable to directors 
of private companies are not subject to Pay As You Earn, whereas amounts payable 
to directors of public companies are subjected as such. (100) Section 1 of the Act 
includes a CC in the definition of a 'company' and it will be regarded for taxation 
purposes as a private company ( 101) so that a donation made by a CC is taxed in the 
donor's hands in the same way as if the donation had been made by a private 
company. ( 102) 
The following is a list of some of the more important advantages relating to 
companies and close corporations alike, namely : 
(i) Perpetual Succession 
In contrast with partnerships and sole proprietorships, their operations and existence 
as a separate legal entity are not affected by the death, resignation or insolvency of 
it's directors, shareholders or members (as the case may be). 
(ii) Corporate Structuring 
It is common for businessmen to form separate companies or CCs for each separate 
business venture. In this way they ensure compartmentalization of their business 
affairs with a view to more effective managerial control, and, in some instances, for 
income tax purposes as well. 
(iii) Limited Liability 
Flowing from the existence of a company and a CC as a separate legal entity is the 
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principle of limited liability of the shareholder, director or member ( as the case may 
be). In the case of a partnership, for instance, the partners are jointly and severally 
liable for all partnership debts. However, the Companies Act and the Close 
Corporations Act do contain provisions providing for personal liability for directors or 
members (as the case may be) should they contravene certain of the provisions of the 
Acts concerned. See for example s63 and s64 of the Close Corporations Act. 
(iv) Taxation 
Some of the tax benefits which companies and CCs enjoyed in the past have been 
reduced by the imposition of STC with regard to the declaration of dividends. 
Currently STC is payable on all dividend distributions at the rate of 12,5%. ( 103) STC 
will not be payable when the company or CC is wound up or liquidated and the profits 
are distributed by the liquidator. ( 104) Even though currently operating through a 
company and CC can be disadvantageous from a tax perspective, it is submitted that 
this complication can be overcome by distributing all available profits as owners or 
members (as the case may be) salaries and interest on capital. In appropriate 
circumstances the lower tax rate applicable to companies and CCs, that is 35%, can 
be utilized. This can be done, for example, when there is an assessed loss in the 
company. With regard to fringe benefits, there are undoubted tax benefits to be 
derived from operating through a company or CC, such as medical contributions, 
retirement benefits, and allowances. ( 105) Also, with the current differential of 10% 
between company (including CCs) tax and individual tax rates, the purchase of an 
existing business with goodwill can, provided certain requirements are met, save tax 
at 10% of the purchase price. Where a company has been converted into a CC, or vice 
versa, the Act deems such company and CC to be the same company for the purposes 
of the Act. The tax implications of such conversion are, inter alia, (i) the assessed loss 
of the former entity is carried over to the new entity and (ii) certain allowances 
claimed by the former entity will have to be added back to income of the new entity 
in the following year of assessment (for eg. s11(j) debtor's allowance, s24 credit 
agreement allowance and s24C allowance in respect of future expenditure on 
contracts). 
The following disadvantages exist in respect of companies and close corporations, 
namely: 
(i) Profits are generally distributed by way of dividend. ( 106) This distribution is 
subject to 12,5% STC but may burden the taxpayer more directly should dividends 
once again become taxable in the hands of the recipient at a rate higher than the 
rate at which a shareholder indirectly bears the brunt of STC. ( 107) 
30. 
(ii) These structures have limited use of their assessed losses in that (a) unlike a sole 
proprietorship or partnership, they will forfeit any balance of assessed loss should no 
trade be conducted during an entire year of assessment and (b) they are only entitled 
to set-off their assessed losses against income derived from trade. ( 108) 
(iii) The rate of tax payable in respect of taxable income is, in the case of an 
adoption of a policy to distribute all, or a substantial portion of, it's profits a 
disincentive to the use of these structures for trading purposes when an alternative 
trading structure attracting an effectively lower rate of tax can be used. 
(iv) Groups of companies are not recognised for tax purposes in South Africa. ( 109) 
Accordingly, there cannot be set-off against the aggregate income of the "group" the 
aggregate expenses and losses thereof. This is unlike the position with regard to 
partnerships, trusts and sole proprietorships where there is only one tax imposed on 
the aggregate of the taxpayer's income derived from all it's ventures less allowable 
expenditure and by virtue of which a set-off of the profits of one trade conducted 
through such a medium against the losses of another trade similarly conducted, 
operates automatically. Also, expenditure incurred by one company within the group 
and which results in another receiving income, is not deductible. ( 110) In view of the 
fact that group taxation is not allowed, businesses which expect start-up losses prefer 
only to convert to companies or CCs once they become profitable. 
(v) Any company (111) is a provisional taxpayer (112) and must make provisional tax 
payments as prescribed in Schedule 4 of the Act. A disadvantage in using a CC, as 
opposed to a company, is that a member of a CC who is ordinarily resident in the 
Republic is, unless the Commissioner directs otherwise, a provisional taxpayer ( 113) 
whereas a shareholder of a company ( 114) who is a South African resident is not a 
provisional taxpayer by reason merely of such share holding. 
(vi) Undistributed profits in the hands of dormant companies (including close 
corporations) cannot be withdrawn on loan, so that owners of such companies must 
chose either to declare a dividend subject to STC or liquidating the company. It must 
be borne in mind that in a process of liquidation only profits of a capital nature can 
be distributed free from STC. 
(vii) In the event that a shareholder or member (as the case may be) requires to draw 
funds from the company concerned in excess of his remuneration or credit loan 
balance, such drawing may also be taxed as a dividend, resulting in unnecessarily high 
taxation rates. 
(viii) In the case of companies holding quoted share investments, there appears to be 
a greater risk of realised profits being taxed. This is primarily due to a difference in 
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Revenue's practice of assessing such transactions in the hands of a company 
(including a CC) as compared with such transactions in the hands of an individual 
taxpayer. In the case of the latter, isolated and sporadic sales are normally not 
queried. 
(ix) If share holding is carried on as a trade thereby resulting in shares being held 
as 'trading stock', then, in terms of s22(1), the individual taxpayer may write same 
down to market value. This concession is, however, not available to companies and 
CCs. 
(x) Partnerships and sole proprietors are allowed more readily the deduction of home 
study costs for income tax purposes. 
(xi) Section 38 of the Companies Act prohibits a company from giving financial 
assistance to any person for the acquisition of it's own shares. This section may, 
effectively, force shareholders to liquidate the company in order to avoid tax on a 
deemed dividend. Although businessmen may, through liquidation, avoid the payment 
of STC, such a move may prove to be costly since the Master's fee ( apart from other 
liquidation costs) could be as much as R25 000. ( 115) Unlike s38 of the Companies 
Act, a CC may, in terms of s40 of the Close Corporations Act, give financial assistance 
to any person for the purpose of, or in connection with, any acquisition of a member's 
interest in that corporation provided the prior written consent of all it's members is 
obtained and provided also the CC meets the solvency and liquidity requirements of 
the Close Corporations Act. It is submitted that where a member borrows money to 
invest in a CC, the interest he pays will be deductible for income tax purposes 
because the distributions he receives from the CC is subject to STC. 
4.2.2 A COMPARISON BETWEEN A COMPANY AND A TRUST 
As regards the issue whether a trust is a vehicle more viable for tax planning 
purposes than a company ( or vice versa), it is submitted that there are compelling 
reasons to prefer a trust to a company. Firstly, with a trust one can avoid the 
restrictions and costs of an audit, annual financial statements (unless the Master so 
requires), as well as annual general meetings (in the case of a trust this is optional) 
required by the Companies Act. Secondly, a trust can enjoy the benefit of perpetual 
succession that a company has together with the limitation of liability that adheres 
to shareholders of a company but without protection being afforded to creditors in 
the form of maintenance of capital, solvency and liquidity. ( 116) With the prevailing 
tax laws and the restrictions imposed by s38 of the Companies Act, it is probably not 
advisable to form a separate company to hold fixed property, although this may be 
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considered a viable option on the grounds of commercial expediency and practical 
advantages where ownership is joint. A trust is flexible while a company, on the other 
hand, is rigid and not adaptable to changing circumstances. Also, Olivier ( 117) points 
out that the mere fact that a trust can be discretionary is reason enough for it to 
be preferable in every case where there is a choice between a trust and a company. 
From a Value-Added Tax (VAT) and Transfer Duty perspective, companies may provide 
a benefit above other business entities. When fixed property is to be sold out of a 
company. the company shares may either be sold or the fixed property itself. If the 
shares are sold, then stamp duty of 0,5% is payable instead of 10% transfer duty or 
14% VAT. Where all the shareholders are natural persons and less than ten in number, 
stamp duty or transfer duty could be avoided entirely if the company is converted to 
a close corporation. since the transfer of member's interest is not subject to stamp 
duty. (118) 
4.2.3 A COMPARISON BETWEEN A CLOSE CORPORATION AND A TRUST 
As regards the choice between a trust and a close corporation as a suitable vehicle 
for tax planning, it is submitted that there are good reasons too for preferring the 
former over the latter. Firstly, while there are no restrictions on a trust as to the 
persons or entities who may be beneficiaries. membership of a CC is limited to ten 
natural persons. While a testamentary trust qualifies for membership of a CC, neither 
a company nor an inter vivas trust qualifies for such membership. The restriction on 
the nature and number of members of a CC has the effect, inter alia, that : 
-a CC cannot become a subsidiary of a company or another CC. Consequently it is not 
possible to include a CC in a group structure other than as a holding company. 
-a CC cannot be sold to a company. In order to effect such sale, the CC would first 
have to be converted to a company and then sold as a going concern. 
-members cannot transfer their interests to an inter vivas trust or a company, nor 
can they participate as members other than as individuals. ( 119) 
In addition, the Close Corporations Act contains various provisions which restricts the 
usefulness of a CC as a trading structure when compared to a trust. These provisions 
relate, inter alia, to the general powers which members have to enter into 
transactions which will bind the CC, the cumbersome procedure prescribed when 
amending the founding document. the restrictions which apply to corporation 
agreements and to agreements between or among members, the numerous instances 
where members or past members can be held liable for debts of the CC, and the 
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requirements regarding accounting records and financial statements. ( 120) A trust is 
not burdened with these requirements and prescriptions. The great flexibility of the 
trust, the ease with which assets can be taken out and conveyed to beneficiaries, the 
separation between formal ownership and the enjoyment of benefits, and the total 
absence of all sorts of restrictive statutory provisions serve to emphasise the 
usefulness of trusts as a trading structure. (121) 
4.2.4 SUMMARY 
Depending on circumstances, it is submitted that the potential tax disadvantages 
attendant upon companies and CCs may well out-weigh their advantages of largely 
unlimited liability and perpetual succession. In light hereof, estate planner's may be 
well advised to consider the viability of conducting trading activities through one or 
other of the unincorporated trading structures ( eg. a business trust). 
4.3 A TABULATED COMPARISON BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT TRADING STRUCTURES 
Below is a table reflecting a comparison between the taxation of the different business 
enterprises. 
Factor Company Partnership Sole Close Trust 
Proprietor Corporation 
1. lncome Flat rate: Progressive Progressive Flat rate : Progressive 
Tax : Rate 35% rate : rate: 35% rate : 
Gold mining: 19% 19% STC: 12,5% 17% (R5000) 
42% (R30000) - (R 30000) - - 45% 
45% 45% (Rl00000) 
STC:12,5% (RlO0 000) (Rl00000) 
2. Splitting No Yes No No Yes 
of income: 
Possible ? 
3.Taxpayer Company Partners Sole Close (i)Founder 







4. Limited Yes No No Yes Yes 
LiabilHy 
5. Limited Yes, s423- Not Not Yes, s63-64 No 
Liability: 424 of the applicable applicable of Act 69 of 
Statutory Companies 1984 
exemptions Act 61 of 
1973 
6. Continuity Indefinite Uncertain Uncertain Indefinite Indefinite 
7.Formation (i}Memo. & Valid No (i)Founding (i)Trust 
Articles of partnership requirement statement Deed 
association agreement 
( oral or in (ii)certificate (ii}Will 
(ii )certificate writing} of 




8. Stamp R350 -CM2 Not Not RlOO -CKl RlOO -inter 
duty on registration applicable applicable registration vivos trust 
registration 
R50 - reserve R50 - reserve 
name name 












10. Tran sf er No, but Yes Not relevant No Trustee: No 
duty: stamp duty · Beneficiary: 
Payable on payable Yes, 
change of depending 
members on facts 
11. Who Company Owned Sole Close Trustee who 
owns the jointly by proprietor corporation holds no 
assets? partners beneficial 
interest in it 
12. Who Directors Partners Sole Members Trustees 
represents proprietor 
the entity? 
13. How (i}Public 2-20 1 1-10 Trustees : 
many company -7 1-20 
members to unlimited 
are allowed? Beneficiary: 
Maximum (ii) Private - unlimited 
1 to 50 
14. No No No Yes, No 
Statutory (i)no juristic 
limits to the person 
number of 
members? (ii) no inter 
vivos trust 
15. Yes, s218 of No, except No, except Yes, s47 of Yes 
Statutory the contractual contractual the Close 
limits to Companies capacity capacity Corporations 
Management Act 61 of Act 69 of 
1973 1984 
J 
16. Financial Compulsory Optional Optional Compulsory. Master may 
Statements i}in public To be require - to 
company - submitted be 
bi-annually annually submitted 
to Registrar annually 
ii )in private 
company -
annually 
(but not to 
Registrar} 
17. Auditing Compulsory Optional Optional Compulsory Master may 
reqmre 
18. Auditor Chartered No No Accounting Preferably 
requirement Accountant Officer as with 
Close 
Corporation 
19. Through Through Through Through Through 
Termination (i) death/ death and liquidation dissolution 
Liquidation insolvency / insolvency and de- and 
insanity registration insolvency 
(ii}De-
registration 
20.Security : Yes Yes Not Yes, but Vested 
interest applicable problematic interest: Yes 
21. Annual Compulsory Optional Not relevant Optional Optional 
General 
Meeting 




23. i}in public Not Yes by Yes by Yes by 
Restrictions company - applicable consent consent consent 
on entry no 









25. Yes No No Yes Yes 
Perpetual 
succession 
26. Juristic Yes No No Yes Not really 
person 
27. Pre - Yes No No Yes Yes 
mcorpor. 
contracts 
28. Agent's Yes Not Yes, but no As with As with 
right to bind applicable Turquand partnership partnership 





29. Owner's No Yes Yes Yes No 
implied right 
to manage 





Taxation of Trusts : Basic Principles 
5.1 TAXATION OF TRUSTS 
5.1.1 GENERAL 
In terms of Practice note 21 inter vivos trusts must be registered for income tax 
purposes at the office of Receiver of Revenue in whose area the office of trustee(s) is 
situated. The income tax assessment is raised on the trustee as representative 
taxpayer. ( 122) Trust income is taxed according to the tax table applicable to persons 
other than natural persons and is not entitled to the primary rebate applicable to 
natural persons. The tax year-end for the individual trustees, and in practice for the 
trust itself, is the end of February each year. SARS approval is required for any other 
date. ( 123) 
Currently the taxation of trusts is governed by sections 1, 7 and 25B of the Act. Trust 
income may be taxed either in the hands of the donor, the trust, the trust 
beneficiary or a combination of any of these persons. When the issue of taxation of 
trust income arises one must consider several factors, inter alia, the terms of the 
trust. whether or not the trust income is distributed, and whether the beneficiaries 
are majors or minors. Generally, beneficiaries are taxed on any previously untaxed 
distributions received by them from the trust (unless s7(3),(4) or (6) of the Act 
apply). The trust itself is usually taxed on any undistributed income left in it's hands 
(unless s7(5) or (7) of the Act apply). (124) When determining the trust's tax liability 
trustee(s) may deduct any expenditure incurred which the trust may deduct in terms 
of sl 1 or any other provision of the Act. ( 125) Generally, tax due by the trust is 
payable out of trust funds. However, s97 of the Act imposes personal liability on the 
trustee(s) in respect of taxes which he was liable to pay in his representative 
capacity, if, while the tax remains unpaid the trustee(s) alienates, charges or disposes 
of the income in respect of which the tax is payable, or where the trustee(s) disposes 
of any fund or money which is in his possession or comes to the trustee(s) after the 
tax is payable or could legally have been paid out of such fund or money. 
5.1.2 THE CONDUlT PRINCIPLE 
With regard to the nature of trust income, it has been held that where income is 
received by a trust and then distributed to trust beneficiaries, the trustee(s) act as 
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a mere administrative conduit pipe through which the income flows. ( 126) In SIR__y 
Rosen Trollip JA ( at 186-7) explained the conduit-pipe principle as follows : 
'In effect the Legislature in those provisions has adopted a principle that can be 
conveniently termed the conduit principle : the registered shareholder is regarded as 
a mere conduit-pipe for passing dividends on to the deemed shareholder, the true 
recipient of them, in whose hands they consequently retain their identity and 
character as dividends. The function of the principle is mostly apposite to trust cases, 
the mere inter-position of the trustee between the dividend-paying companies and 
the beneficiary not being regarded as sufficient to change the character of the 
dividends as they pass to the latter.' The learned Judge went on to say the following 
(per obiter dictum) : 
'A trust deed may endow the trustee with the discretion to pass on dividends to the 
beneficiary or to retain and accumulate them. If he decides on the latter, I think (but 
express no firm view) that the dividends might then lose their identity and character 
as dividends, so that, if they are paid out to the beneficiary in a subsequent year, 
they might possibly no longer be dividends in his hands, for the conduit-pipe had 
turned itself off at the relevant time. But if he decides on the former, that is to pass 
the dividends on to the beneficiary, the condition suspending the beneficiary's 
entitlement thereto is fulfilled, and they would constitute dividends in his hands in 
the same way as if he had been originally entitled to them unconditionally under the 
trust deed, that is as if the conduit-pipe had always been open.' 
In other words, in terms of the conduit principle the trust acts as a mere pipe 
through which the income flows to a beneficiary; therefore the income retains ~it's 
identity. A trustee will not incur any tax liability in his representative capacity if all 
the trust income is distributed to the beneficiaries because the income passes 
through the trust and is taxable in the beneficiaries' hands. Vesting in the trust 
beneficiary must, however, occur in the year of receipt or accrual of the income; 
income which vests in the beneficiaries will not first be taxed in the trust and 
thereafter in the hands of the beneficiaries. ( 127) Vested income, whether paid or 
accrued to a beneficiary, is taxed in the hands of the beneficiary except where 
s7(3),(4) or (6) of the Act apply. Any income retained in trust is taxed in the hands 
of trust, except where s7(5) or (7) of the Act apply. Any distribution from retained . 
income is deemed to be of a capital nature and is therefore not taxed in the hands 
of it's recipient. ( 128) 
In circumstances where the conduit principle finds application, trust beneficiaries are 
entitled to claim any tax exemptions which apply to trust income distributed to them, 
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except if the income is paid in the form of an annuity. ( 129) Therefore if dividend 
income received by a trust is distributed to a beneficiary in the same year in which 
it is so received. it retains it's identity as dividend and is. accordingly, in terms of 
s10(1)(k) exempt from tax in the beneficiary's hands. In Rosen's case the court held 
that the conduit principle applies even where a beneficiary received income in the 
form of an annuity from a trust. For eg., assume that a trust receives R100 000 
interest income and R50 000 dividend income in a tax year. It pays an annuity of 
R5000 per month to a beneficiary. In terms of the decision in Rosen's case the 
beneficiary will be taxed on R40 000 (interest) and R20 000 (tax-free dividend) while 
the trust is taxed on the retained portion of interest income. However. in terms of 
s10(2) of the Act the exemption in s10( 1 )(k) does not apply in the case of dividends 
received as an annuity. ( 130) This means that annuities paid to trust beneficiaries are 
fully taxable in their hands, regardless of the source of the income out of which the 
annuities are paid ( 131) A further example of a tax exemption is s10( 1 )(hA) of the Act 
which exempts interest earned by non-residents. It is submitted that this provision 
is advantageous from a tax planning perspective in that if a trust, the beneficiaries 
whereof are both resident and non-resident. is in receipt of interest income as well 
as dividend income. then a trustee(s) may award the interest income to the non-
resident (in whose hands such income is tax exempt) and the dividends to the 
resident beneficiaries (in whose hands such distributions are exempt from tax). 
5.1.3 TRUSTS AND IT'S ASSESSED LOSSES 
Section 20( 1) of the Act allows a trust. for the purpose of determining it's taxable 
income derived from the carrying on of any trade in the Republic, to set-off against 
it's income any balance of assessed loss incurred by it in any previous year which has 
been carried forward from the preceding tax year. Conshu (Pty) Ltd. v CIR ( 132) held 
that the word 'income' in s20( 1) should not be construed in it's defined sense but 
rather as taxable income but for the set-off of an assessed loss. This means that a 
set-off under s20( 1) only arises if there would otherwise have been taxable income. 
ie. pre-tax profit. The expression 'balance of assessed loss' refers to a situation where 
the income or taxable income of a particular tax year is more than swallowed up by 
deductions. a current year's assessed loss and/ or the assessed loss of a previous year, 
resulting in a balance of assessed loss which can then be carried forward to the 
succeeding year of assessment and set off against the income of that year. If in a 
year (year 2) subsequent to that in which such balance of assessed loss was 
ascertained (year 1) the taxpayer derives no income from carrying on a trade against 
which such balance can be set-off to arrive at a fresh balance of assessed loss to be 
carried forward, then in the following year (year 3), the taxpayer is precluded from 
setting off the initial balance (ie. from year 1) against it's income by the requirement 
that the balance to be set-off must have been carried forward from the preceding 
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year of assessment (year 2). (133) SA Bazaars (Pty) Ltd. v CIR (134) held that the 
balance of assessed loss may only be set-off against income derived by the taxpayer 
from the carrying on of a trade; and where no trade is carried on the balance of 
assessed loss is irretrievably lost. However, in the case of a trust, s20(2A)(b) provides 
that an assessed loss is not lost if a taxpayer other than a company (eg. a trust) does 
not derive any income during a particular tax year so that such assessed loss may 
therefore be carried forward to a succeeding tax year. 
5.1.4 TAXATION UNDER SECTION 25B 
Undistributed trust income which does not vest in a beneficiary is subject to tax in 
the hands of the trust. Section 25B( 1) of the Act provides that 'any income received 
by or accrued to or in favour of any person in his capacity as the trustee of a trust 
as referred to in the definition of 'person' in section 1, shall, subject to the provisions 
of section 7, to the extent to which such income has been derived for the immediate 
or future benefit of any ascertained beneficiary with a vested right to such income, 
be deemed to be income which has accrued to such beneficiary, and to the extent to 
which such income is not so derived, be de·emed to be income which has accrued to 
such trust.' (135) The words 'ascertained beneficiary with a vested right' means a 
beneficiary entitled to the trust income and whose right passes to his estate on death 
even if the income is payable only at the termination of the trust. ( 136) 
Section 258(2) provides that 'where a beneficiary has acquired a vested right to any 
income referred to in section 25B( 1) in consequence of the exercise by the trustee of 
a discretion vested in him in terms of the relevant deed of trust, agreement or will 
of a deceased person, such income shall for the purposes of that subsection be 
deemed to have been derived for the benefit of such beneficiary.' (137) This section 
leaves the conduit principle ( discussed earlier) intact. 
It is permissible for a trust to deduct expenditure and losses incurred in the 
production of income to the extent to which such expenses and losses were laid out 
or expended for the purposes of trade. ( 138) Prior to the enactment of s25B(3) losses 
and deductions were not available to beneficiaries but were retained by the trust. 
Section 258(3) provides that 'any deduction or allowance which may be made under 
the Act in the determination of the taxable income derived by way of any income 
ref erred to in s25B( 1) shall, to the extent to which such income is under the 
provisions of that subsection deemed to be income which has accrued to a beneficiary 
or to the trust, be deemed to be a deduction or allowance which may be made in the 
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determination of the taxable income derived by such beneficiary or trust, as the case 
may be.' 
Practice note 23 states that the wording in s25B(3) 'to the extent to which' does not 
have a ring-fencing effect but in fact means that deductions and allowances relating 
to income which has been allocated between a trust and trust beneficiary must be 
apportioned between them in the same proportion. The effect hereof is that the 
deduction is not only allowable against trust income, but may be deducted against 
any income received by or accrued to the beneficiaries. In addition, a trust 
beneficiary is permitted to deduct the trust's tax losses to the extent that the trust 
income vests in such beneficiary. ( 139) For example, a trust receives income in a 
particular year of assessment amounting to R30000 and expenditure amounting to 
R10000 was made in the production of such income. Assume that 60% (R18000) of the 
income vests in the beneficiary and the remaining 40% (R12000) vests in the trust. 
The trust can then claim 40% of the deductions (R4000) while the beneficiaries can 
claim 60% (R6000). The beneficiary will also be able to claim pro rata any allowances 
which relates to the earning of such trust income ( eg. capital allowances). 
5.1.5 TAXATION UNDER SECTION 7 
With regard to the taxation of trust income the provisions of section 7(3)-(7) of the 
Act are of particular importance. A detailed analysis of each of these sub-sections, 
however, falls beyond the scope of this dissertation. For the purposes hereof I will 
endeavour merely to provide an analysis of some of the most important concepts 
embodied in these sub-sections and outline the principles that have been enunciated 
by our courts in respect thereof. 
5.1.5.1 Requirements for the application of s7(3)-(7) 
In order for s7(3)-(7) of the Act to be operative certain requirements must be 
satisfied. These are: 
there must be a donation, settlement or other disposition. 
the income sought to be taxed must be received or accrued by reason of the 
donation, settlement or other disposition. 
in order for s7(3) to apply the income must be received by or accrued to a 
minor child of the donor. See also s7(4) which serves as an anti-avoidance 
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measure for· s7(3). Section 7(3) does not apply to grandparents making a 
donation, settlement or other disposition to their grandchildren. Neither s7(3) 
nor s7(4) apply to grandchildren or majors, nor do they apply once the donor 
dies since he is no long~r an income taxpayer. 
in order for s7(5) to apply the donation, settlement or other disposition must 
be made subject to a condition or stipulation that the beneficiaries or some 
of them shall not receive the trust income or part thereof until the happening 
of some event, whether fixed or contingent. 
the person making the donation, settlement or other disposition must still be 
alive. 
in order for s7( 6) and (7) to apply a right to receive income must be 
transferred. 
5.1.5.2 General Concepts embodied in s7(3)-s7(7) 
(a) The meaning of 'donation. settlement or other disposition' in s7(3)-s7(7) of the 
Income Tax Act 
A requirement appearing in each of the aforesaid sub-sections which must be 
satisfied in order to render them operative, is that relating to the expression 
'donation, settlement or other disposition'. 
The meaning of 'donation' 
In terms of Roman-Dutch law a 'donation' is regarded as a disposal of property for 
no consideration, that is a wholly gratuitous disposal of property made out of 
liberality or generosity. In Ovenstone v SIR (140) the court (per Trollip JA) (at 736H) 
highlighted the meaning of 'donation' as follows : 
'In a 'donation' the donor disposes of property gratuitously out of liberality or 
generosity, the donee being thereby enriched and the donor correspondingly 
impoverished, so much so that if the donee gives any consideration at all therefor, 
it is not a donation.' 
This construction of 'donation' was further amplified in CIR v Berold 1962 (3) SA 748 
(A) (at 753F-G) where the court (per Hoexter JA) held that an interest-free loan by 
the taxpayer could be regarded as a 'continuous donation' for the purposes of s7. On 
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the facts of that case it was held that as long as the taxpayer refrained from 
compelling a company to which he had sold valuable assets to repay the amount 
owing, on which no interest was payable, there was a continuing donation to the 
company of the interest on that loan. On the facts, this donation was held to render 
s7(3) operative. However, the court in Joss v CIR (141) (at 682H, 683A & D] was of the 
view that an interest-free loan formed part of the term 'or other disposition' within 
the phrase 'donation settlement or other disposition'. (142) 
The meaning of 'settlement' 
In Joss v SIR (supra) (at 680F & 6818) it was held that 'the settlement would not 
include a transaction made for full value in money or money's worth' and that 'the 
notion of 'settlement' is inextricably bound up with motives of liberality (there is 
usually a 'beneficiary' in whose favour the settlement is made for the purpose of his 
enjoyment of the asset so settled)'. This view was later confirmed in Ovenstone v SIR 
(supra) at 737A-E. (143) A 'settlement' differs from a 'donation' in that a settlement 
is a disposal of property made subject to specific terms and conditions. This 
difference was pointed out by Trollip JA in Ovenstone's case (supra) (at 737A - E) in 
the following words : 
'In a settlement the property is usually disposed of upon specific terms and conditions 
as set out in a deed of settlement, to or through the medium of a trustee or trustees 
for the benefit of some person, or for the benefit of persons in succession as in a 
fideicommissum ...... As far as the beneficiaries are concerned a settlement is also 
generally made gratuitously out of liberality or generosity in the sense that no 
consideration usually passes from them to the settlor for the benefits conferred on 
them. 'Settlement' is thus usually of the same genus as 'donation'. True, consideration 
may sometimes pass for a settlement, but the kind of 'settlement' envisaged by the 
critical phrase 'donation, settlement or other disposition' ............... ..is a gratuitous one 
or one that is gratuitous to an appreciable extent. For if a settlement is made for due 
consideration, it would, in reality be a purely commercial or business transaction, 
which ........ would fall outside the scope of s7(3)-(6).' 
The meaning of 'or other disposition' 
The word 'disposition' is not defined in the Act. The meaning of the words 'other 
disposition' were the subject of judicial consideration in Joss v SIR (supra) and later 
in Ovenstone v SIR (supra). 
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In the Joss case, Coetzee J (at 769B-C) held that the words 'other disposition' in the 
context of s7 of the Act could not possibly mean every disposition which is recognised 
in law since such an interpretation would lead to absurd results. He held that because 
there is an element of liberality or benefaction in most settlements therefore 
'settlement' would not include a transaction made for full value in money or money's 
worth. Accordingly, he held that 'other disposition' in the expression 'donation, 
settlement or other disposition' must be construed eijusdem generis, and 'other 
disposition' does not include a transaction for full consideration or value and must 
include an element of gratuity or liberality. Coetzee J went on to say that if a 
disposition was partly gratuitous and partly for consideration then one may apportion 
the income attributable to the element of gratuity and the element of consideration. 
The decision in the Joss case (supra) was confirmed by the Appellate Division in 
Ovenstone's case (supra). In casu the court held that although the ordinary meaning 
of the word 'disposition' is wide and encompasses any making over, parting with or 
transferring of property to another, (144) it's use in s7 indicates that it does not bear 
it's ordinary unrestricted meaning. This is so because : 
'it would then include a disposition of property made under a bona fide commercial, 
business, or at arm's length contract for full or fair consideration in money or 
money's worth to not only a minor child (s7(3) and (4)) but also to any other person 
(s7(4).(5) and (6)). It is inconceivable that the Legislature could have intended (by 
these provisions) to hamper persons who wish to enter into contracts of that kind. 
The transactions the Legislature seems to have had in mind in enacting (these 
provisions) are those in which a taxpayer seeks to achieve tax avoidance by donating, 
or disposing of income-producing property to or in favour of another under the ...... . 
specified conditions or circumstances, thereby diverting it's income from himself 
without replacing or being able lo replace it.' 
Trollip JA in Ovenstone's case (supra) confirmed that the words 'other disposition' 
must be construed eijusdem generis with 'donation' and 'settlement' so that the 
expression 'donation, settlement or other disposition' should be read as 'donation, 
settlement or other similar dispostion', and that the word 'disposition' means any 
disposal of property made wholly or to an appreciable extent gratuitously out of 
liberality or generosity of the disposer. In so doing the learned Judge rejected the view 
adopted in Barnett v COT (145) to the extent that the court in that case held that 
'disposition' could include a disposition for due consideration, that is a commercial 
transaction. Trollip JA, in reaching his conclusion, said the following (at 74) : 
'Hence the words 'donation, settlement or other disposition' all have this feature in 
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common : they each connote the disposal of property to another otherwise than for 
due consideration, that is otherwise than commercially or in the course of business. 
'Donation' and 'settlement' have this feature in common : the disposal of property is 
made gratuitously or ( occasionally in the case of 'settlement') gratuitously to an 
appreciable extent. Since 'disposition', the general word that rounds off the critical 
phrase, was not intended to have it's wide, unrestricted meaning, I think that it is an 
appropriate situation in which to circumscribe it's scope by extending that common 
element of gratuitousness to it too by the eijusdem generis or noscitur a sociis rule. 
The critical phrase should, in other words, read as 'any donation, settlement or other 
similar disposition'. So construed, 'disposition' means any disposal of property made 
wholly or to an appreciable extent gratuitously out of the liberality or generosity of 
the disposer.' Trollip JA ( at 76) summarised the position as follows : 
'To sum up: the critical phrase in section 7(3) - 'any donation, settlement or other 
disposition'- excludes any disposal of property that is a wholly commercial or 
business one, that is made for due consideration; it covers any disposal of property 
made wholly gratuitously out of liberality or generosity; it also covers any disposal of 
property made under a settlement or other disposition for some consideration but in 
which there is an appreciable element of gratuitousness and liberality or generosity.' 
With regard to apportionment, Trollip JA (at 7408-F) said the following : 
'If the consideration is merely illusory, simulated or minimal, the disposal will, of 
course, be regarded as wholly gratuitous. On the other hand, merely because the 
settlement or disposition contains some element of bounty or gratuitousness that is 
insufficient to render s7(3) applicable; such element must be appreciable for that to 
happen ..... Now where the consideration, while not being due consideration, is 
nevertheless appreciable, it will mean that the income in question under s7(3) will 
usually have accrued or been received 'by reason of' both elements of gratuitousness 
and consideration. I see no reason why in those circumstances the income should not 
be apportioned between the two elements. The words 'by reason of' themselves suggest 
some apportionment in order to give effect to the real cause of the accrual or receipt 
of the income. If such apportionment is not possible, or if insufficient evidence is 
adduced to enable the court to effect it.. .... , the composite disposal will usually, 
because of it's appreciable element of bounty, be then simply treated as a gratuitous 
settlement or disposition, as the case may be, that falls within the scope of the 
critical phrase.' 
In Joss v CIR (supra) it was held that an interest-free loan in respect of the purchase 
price of shares acquired was deemed to be a 'disposition' within the meaning of s7(3). 
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( 146) This was confirmed by the Appellate Division in Ovenstone's case (supra). In light 
of these two cases it is trite law that an interest-free loan is a 'disposition', being 
eijusdem generis with 'donation' and 'settlement'. 
(b) The meaning of 'by reason of' in Section 7(3)-s7(7) of the Income Tax Act 
The words 'by reason of', as employed in s7(3)-s7(7), establish a causal connection 
between the donation, settlement or other disposition and the income which is 
deemed to be the donor's income. ( 14 7) These words have been interpreted by our 
courts in the context of s7(3) and, it is submitted, there is no good reason why the 
same interpretation cannot be applied to s7(4)-(7). (148) 
In terms of s7(3) income is deemed to be received by the parent ('donor') of a minor 
child and is taxable in the hands of the parent where the income is received by, 
accrued to or accumulated in favour of such child 'by reason of any donation, 
settlement, or other disposition by such parent'. In Kohler v CIR ( 149) the court 
discussed the meaning to be attributed to the words 'by reason of'. In casu the 
taxpayer settled a sum of money on each of his minor children under a deed of 
donation which conferred on him the power to acquire further investments with the 
income made from any investment of such money. The taxpayer later used interest 
earned through the investment of the original donation to purchase shares for the 
donees in a company from which the donees received 8728 pounds in the 1946 tax 
year. During the same year certain deposits of accumulated income in a savings 
account by one of the donees earned 9 pounds interest. The legal issue in casu was 
whether it was 'by reason of' the donation made by the taxpayer that the sums 
concerned had been received by or accrued to the donees or were deemed to have 
been so received or accrued thereby entitling the Commissioner to tax it in the hands 
of the donor. The court (per Murray J) held that once income had ( actually or by 
deeming) accrued to or been received by a minor, and had been capitalised, it's 
subsequent earning or product was to be attributed not to the source from which the 
original income was derived, but to the advantageous employment of the minor's new 
capital. ( 150) In this respect the 'income upon income' stood on the same footing as 
income derived by the minor from the employment of other capital of his (whether 
borrowed, earned or bequeathed). The court held further that income upon income 
did not fall within the provisions of s7(3) of the Act on the grounds that the words 
'by reason of' referred to the proximate and not the remote cause and that the 
causal connection between the donation and the accrual ( or receipt) of income upon 
income was interrupted by the introduction of a novus actus, namely the re-
investment of the original income, and it was 'by reason of' this re-investment that 
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such accrual (or receipt) took place. On the facts it was held that the purchase of the 
shares in the private company and the re-investment of income in a savings account 
amounted to such a novus actus interveniens. The court concluded that although the 
original donation may have been a sine qua non it was not the causa 'by reason of' 
which the amounts concerned were derived by the minors. 
The Appellate Division in CIR v Berold (supra) the court adopted the decision in 
Widan's case, namely that for s7(3) to find application there had to be a causal 
connection between the donor's donation and the income earned. On the facts of the 
case it was held that the effective cause ('by reason of') of the dividends being 
received in the trusts for the benefit of the donor's children was the donation of the 
parent and s7(3) could, accordingly, be successfully invoked. 
The reasoning in Kohler's case regarding the interpretation of the words 'by reason 
of' was not followed in CIR v Widan ( 151) where it was held that these words implied 
that there must be some causal relation between the donation and the income in 
question and that in ascertaining if such causal relation exists one must not 
necessarily look to the cause which is proximate in time but to the real efficient 
cause of the income being received. If the latter cause is the donation by the parent 
then s7(3) applies. It held that the real efficient cause is a matter to be ascertained 
in light of all the facts and circumstances of the case in question. Centlivres CJ said, 
with regard to Kohler's case, that Murray J came to his conclusion on the grounds 
that the words 'by reason of' should be interpreted as referring to proximate and not 
the remote cause. The Chief Justice held that if this reasoning was correct then it 
would follow that interest earned by the investment of capital donated to a minor by 
it's parent would not fall under s7(3) for in such a case the proximate cause (as 
understood by Murray J) which resulted in the earning of interest would be the act 
of investment and not the donation itself. In other words, the operation of s7(3) would 
be confined to cases where a parent donated to his minor child invested capital which 
produced income at the time the donation was made. 
It must, however, be pointed out that while the Appellate Division in Widan's case did 
not expressly overturn the decision in Kohler's case , it held that it was unlikely that 
the legislature intended that the words 'by reason of' should have such a narrow 
interpretation as employed by Murray J. The Appellate Division held that the 
determination of the proximate cause was a matter of fact and the question whether 
any income was received or accrued 'by reason of' a donation by a parent was purely 
a factual one. Accordingly, the question whether income upon income falls within the 
provisions of s7(3) does not admit of an absolute answer and must be answered on 
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the merit of each case. ( 152) 
(c) The meaning of 'stipulation or condition ........ to the effect that the beneficiaries 
....... shall not receive the income .......... until the happening of some event. 
whether fixed or contingent.. ..... ' in s7(5) 
Section 7(5) of the Act reads as follows : 
'If any person has made any donation, settlement or other disposition which is subject 
to a stipulation or condition, whether made or imposed by such person or anybody 
else, to the effect that the beneficiaries thereof or some of them shall not receive the 
income or some portion of the income thereunder until the happening of some event, 
whether fixed or contingent, so much of any income as would, but for the stipulation 
or condition, in consequence of the donation, settlement or other disposition be 
received by or accrue to or in favour of the beneficiaries, shall, until the happening 
of that event or the death of that person, whichever first takes place, be deemed to 
be income of that person.' 
Section 7(5) applies only in respect of income 'in consequence of' the donation, 
settlement or other disposition. It does not apply to any other income which may 
have been received by the trust, and which was not received by reason of these acts. 
( 153) 
Estate Dempers v CIR ( 154) (at 421F-E) the court held that in determining the 
applicability of section 7(5) of the Act one must first decide whether the hypothesis 
is satisfied, that is whether the trust deed contains a stipulation to the effect that 
the beneficiaries of the donation, settlement or other disposition shall not receive the 
income thereunder or some portion thereof until the happening of some event, 
whether fixed or contingent. If it does then so much of the income as would in 
consequence of any donation, but for the stipulation, be received by or accrue to or 
in favour of the beneficiaries be deemed to be the income of the donor until the 
happening of the event or the death of the donor, whichever takes place first. The 
court (per Corbett CJ) held further ( at 425F) that : 
'In the application of s7(5) a vested right to the accumulated income is not a sine 
qua non. Naturally, if the beneficiaries have a vested right this would be a strong, 
possibly decisive, factor leading to the conclusion that, but for the stipulation 
withholding the income, it would have been received by them. That (section 7(5)) is 
not confined in it's application to instances where the beneficiary has a vested right 
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to the income which is to be withheld, is indicated, in my view by the use of the 
words 'fixed or contingent' in denoting the event until the happening of which he is 
not to receive the income. A 'contingent event' is an event which may or may not 
happen.' Corbett CJ then went on to say (at 426C et seq) that : 
'In truth the application of the devolutionary portion of the subsection involves a 
hypothetical, notional enquiry which cannot be directed solely to questions such as 
whether the beneficiary's right to income is vested or contingent. The question which 
the court must ask itself is whether, in the absence of the stipulation withholding 
trust income, the income would have· been received by or accrued to the beneficiary. 
In answering this question one must have regard to the terms of the instrument 
generally, the donor's general benevolent intention as evinced by the terms of the 
deed, and all other relevant circumstances. In this inquiry the fact that in terms of 
the instrument as a whole the beneficiary had a vested right to the income would 
be ..... an important factor, but it would not be the sole touchstone.' 
It must, however, be pointed out that in ITC 1328 ( 155) the court (per Milne J) held 
that s7(5) will not apply where the beneficiary has a vested right to the income in the 
sense that his right to the income is certain albeit that the enjoyment thereof is 
postponed; in such an instance the income is deemed to be that of the beneficiary 
in terms of s7( 1 ). Furthermore, Milne J held that s7(5) postulated a situation where. 
because of the condition withholding receipt of the income, there was no receipt or 
accrual; consequently, if there was an accrual despite the condition withholding 
receipt then s7(5) was inoperative. In other words, s7(5) did not apply to any income, 
the receipt whereof being withheld, which had accrued to or was deemed to have 
accrued to the beneficiary. Although the view expressed in ITC 1328 does not accord 
with the tenor of the decision in the Dempers case. the Commissioner applies it as 
such in practice. It is accordingly submitted that a planner may be able to 
circumvent the provisions of s7(5) by making a distribution of trust income to a 
beneficiary on loan account without actually paying it out to such beneficiary. 
The 'event' referred to in s7(5) may be the death of a certain person, the attainment 
of a certain age, the date of marriage of a beneficiary or some other clearly defined 
future happening. ( 156) Although our courts (157) have on occasion held that the 
exercise of a trustee's discretion with regard to the withholding or distribution of 
trust income qualifies as an 'event' for the purposes of s7(5), there has unfortunately 
been no authoritative ruling on this issue. The Appellate Division ( 158) has on two 
occasions had the opportunity to pronounce on this issue, but found that it was 
unnecessary on the facts of the case to do so. 
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5.2. TABULATED SUMMARY OF TAXATION OF TRUSTS 
Huxam and Haupt ( 159) explains the taxation of trusts with reference to the following 
two tables : 
1. Discretionary trust? YES 
2. Distribute income to 
YES----beneficiaries NO 
A A 
3. Donor alive? YES NO YES NO 
I\ /\ I\ A 4. Beneficiary a minor of 
donor? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
5. Tax I D B B B D D T T 
Key: D = Donor B = Beneficiary T = Trust 
1. Discretionary trust? NO 
2. Distribute income to 
YES~ hen efi ciari es? NO 
~ /\ 
3. Donor alive? YES NO YES NO 
(\ I\ I\ I\ 4. Beneficiary a minor of 
donor? YES NO 
T 
NO YES NO YES NO 
5. Tax l I I B B B D B B B 
Key: D= Donor B= Beneficiary T= Trust 
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Below is a table which summarises the taxation of trust income and that of trust 
beneficiaries. 
PERSON TAXED TAXATION OF TRUST SECTION OF THE ACT/ 
INCOME CASE 
1. SETTLOR : Parent BENEFICIARY : Minor Child ( own 
child) . 
(a) Parent Income received by or Section 7(3) 
accrued to minor that is CIR v Widan 
attributable to parent's CIR v Berold 
gratuitous disposition. Ovenstone v CIR 
(b) Minor Child Income received by or Section 7( 1) 
accrued to minor for full Joss v SIR 
consideration, ie. Ovenstone v SIR 
disposition for full value. Section 25B(1) & (2) 
2. SETTLOR : Parent BENEFICIARY : Major Child 
(a) Beneficiary (i) income actually Section 1 'gross income' 
received Section 7( 1) 
(ii) income due and ITC 1328 
payable, ie. accrued Section 25B( 1) 
but not received. 
(b) Parent Income not received by Section 7(5) 
or accrued to beneficiary ITC 1328 
as a result of settlor's Estate Dempers v SIR 
stipulation or condition. SIR v Sidley 
(c) Trustee (if settlor is Income withheld in terms Section 1 'gross income' 
dead) of trustee's discretion Section 25B( 1) 
and which does not 
accrue to beneficiary. 
3. SETTLOR : Any Person BENEFICIARY : Minor Child (not own 
child) 
(a) Beneficiary (i) income actually Section 1 'gross income' 
received Section 7( 1) 
(ii) income accrued but ITC 1328 
not received. Section 25B(1) & (2) 
(b) Settlor 
(c) Trustee (if settlor is 
dead) 
4. SETTLOR : Any Person 
Parents of Beneficiary 
Income not received by 
or accrued to beneficiary 
in terms of settlor's 
stipulation or condition. 
Income withheld in terms 
of trustee's discretion 
and which does not 
accrue to beneficiary. 
Section 7(5) 
ITC 1328 
Estate Dempers v SIR 
SIR v Sidley 
Section 1 'gross income' 
Section 258( 1) 
BENEFICIARY : Another person's 
minor child with 
reciprocal benefits for 
settlor or his family 
Income received by or 
accrued to minor child. 
Section 7(4) 
5. SETTLOR : Husband or Wife BENEFICIARY : other Spouse (living 
together) 
Husband if wife is Income received by or Section 7(2) 
beneficiary, or vice versa accrued to wife/husband 
can be taxed in the other 
spouse's hands if 
provisions of section 7(2) 
are met. 
6. SETTLOR : Any person who confers a right to income but retains the power to 
revoke or confer the right upon another 
BENEFICIARY : Any Person 
Settlor Income received or Section 7( 6) 
accrued in terms of 
conferred right so long as 
the power to revoke is 
retained. 
7. SETTLOR : Any person who donates/settles a right to receive income in such a 
manner that he remains the owner or retains an interest. or is 
entitled to regain ownership or the interest in the income-
producing property or the right to receive income. 
BENEFICIARY : Any Person 
Settlor /Donor Any income ( eg. rent, Section 7(7) 
dividends, interest) 
received by the 
beneficiary. 
N.QI.E : With effect from 1 March 1995 the income of a trust is taxed according to 
the tax table applicable to persons other than natural persons. 
SUMMARY 
In the case of trusts, income tax savings is no longer as beneficial due to the 
implementation of sections 7 and 25B of the Act. Section 7 is essentially a general 
anti-avoidance provision which, when operative, overrides s25B. Depending on the 
wording of the trust instrument, the trust can be a conduit for the distribution of 
income to the beneficiaries. (160) Income received by or accrued to a trust which is 
distributed to trust beneficiaries during the fiscal year in which the income is 
received by or accrued to the trust will be taxed in the hands of the beneficiary. 
(161) This is the position even if the income has not actually been paid over to the 
beneficiary but has been invested, accumulated or otherwise capitalised on their 
behalf. ( 162) If the trust traps the income in the year in which it is received by, or 
accrued to, the trust in the sense that it is not distributed to beneficiaries in that 
year, then the trust itself will be liable to tax in respect of that income unless, by 
virtue of s7(5) or (7) of the Act, liability for tax in respect of such income attaches 
to the founder of the trust. As in the case of partnerships and sole proprietors, tax 
is levied at a progressive rate; no rebates are, however, available. If trust income vests 
in a trust beneficiary then such beneficiary may, in terms of s25B(3), off-set losses 
and deductions against his taxable income in the same proportion in which the 
income is allocated between the trust and the beneficiary. The distinction between 
vested and discretionary trusts is thus important. The distribution of trust property 
to beneficiaries is not regarded as a donation for the purposes of donations tax. (163) 
If fixed trust property is transferred to trust beneficiaries in terms of the provisions 
of the trust instrument, then no transfer duty is payable under certain 




The issue as to whether a trust is an effective vehicle for estate planning is in each 
case a factual one. In the determination of this issue tax considerations play an 
important (but not over-riding) role. Other objective factors must also be considered. 
These include, inter alia, the planner's specific needs and goals, economic and 
commercial considerations, practical application, flexibility, the promotion of family 
harmony, and limited liability. When considering these factors the viability of other 
structures as suitable alternatives must, of necessity, be considered. A dream of tax 
saving can easily be converted into a nightmare if these factors are not afforded due 
consideration. With regard to taxation in particular, it must be emphasised that the 
taxation of trusts is, at present, a grey area. Uncertainty prevails as to the imposition 
of, inter alia, a capital transfer tax , periodic valuations, and also a generation 
skipping tax. To countenance possible future legislative threats to planning with 
trusts, it is advisable for planners to prepare trust instruments which allows 
considerable flexibility, particularly in so far as it relates to the powers of the 
trustee( s) to accelerate or postpone the termination date of the trust. In this way 
planners will be able to effect adjustments in accordance with their future needs, 
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